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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE provides guidance to senior management
and general counsel ("Counsel") of aviation companies,
such as small air carriers, and aircraft and aircraft parts manu-
facturers, installers, or maintainers (the "Company" or "Compa-
nies") on shepherding their Companies through an aviation
disaster crisis management planning process. Detailed texts that
address general crisis management planning abound.' But
three things make the planning material in this article unique.
In fact, I relied on many different crisis-management books in compiling in-
formation for these materials. Here are a number of the books I used, listed in
reverse chronological order: JEFFREY R. CAPONIGRO, THE CRISIS COUNSELOR, A
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO MANAGING A BUSINESS CRISIS (2000); W. TIMOTHY COOMBS,
ONGOING CRISIS COMMUNICATION: PLANNING, MANAGING, AND RESPONDING (Rob-
ert L. Heath & Gabriel M. Vesquez eds., 1999); MICHEL OGRIZEK &JEAN-MICHEL
GUILLERY, COMMUNICATING IN CRISIS (Helen Kimball-Brooke & Robert Z. Brooke
trans., 1997); DOUGLAS M. HENDERSON, IS YOUR BUSINESS READY FOR THE NEXT
DISASTER? (1996); CRISIS RESPONSE, INSIDE STORIES ON MANAGING IMAGE UNDER
SIEGE (Jack A. Gottschalk ed., 1993); LAURENCE BARTON, CRISIS IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS: MANAGING AND COMMUNICATING IN THE HEAT OF CHAOS (Jeanne R.
Busemeyer ed., 1993); DIEUDONNEE TEN BERGE, THE FIRST 24 HOURS (1988); and
MARION K. PINSDORF, COMMUNICATING WHEN YOUR COMPANY IS UNDER SIEGE, SUR-
VIVING PUBLIC CRISIS (1987).
Much of the material below incorporates many basic concepts that appear in
most, if not all of these texts. I do not cite to all of them when discussing such
concepts, but instead provide references to specific books where otherwise appro-
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First, this material was created with Counsel in mind. Many
texts address crisis management planning from a generic level
that rarely provides much, if any, information on topics such as
the attorney-client privilege. Second, this material was formu-
lated with the Company's aviation business in mind. It includes
a discussion on potential aviation regulatory, civil, and criminal
liabilities that typically do not appear in the general texts.
Third, this material is an amalgam of these detailed texts. This
article is designed to serve as a "single-source" document that
provides a comprehensive outline for a workable crisis manage-
ment planning process without going into too much back-
ground detail, while also providing extensive references to
supporting materials if a Company wants to investigate certain
issues in detail.
Some Companies view a crisis management plan merely as a
series of checklists or prepared statements to follow in the event
of a crisis. But the real value of such a plan lies not in the fin-
ished product; rather, it lies in the process of creating that prod-
uct. Considering various options and responsibilities raised by a
crisis in a pressure-free, pre-crisis environment is much easier
and more beneficial than considering those issues for the first
time immediately after a crisis occurs, even if the Company has
generic checklists and prepared statements in place.
This material is therefore divided into two parts. The main
part is the main body of this article, which contains preparation
material that provides a vehicle to conduct the organization and
creation of a crisis management plan well before the need for
such a plan arises. The second part is a series of appendixes
that contains templates of the final work product itself-checkl-
ists and prepared statements-that, through the work of the ap-
propriate people within the Company, may become the actual
crisis management plan.
priate. I also cite throughout the text a number of law review articles, treatises,
and other such materials that I relied on in putting this manual together.
2 But a note of caution is warranted. As one businessperson and crisis manage-
ment commentator observed, there can be no basic or formulaic approach to
effective crisis management planning: "[T]he right response to a crisis for one
organization may be the exact opposite of the right response for another in what
seem to be similar circumstances." CIsIs RESPONSE, supra note 1, at ix-x (from
forward by Kurt P. Stocker, chief corporate relations officer for Continental Bank
Corporation). Thus, the focus of these materials is an outline of the planning
process, not a plan itself.
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- II. GENERAL DISCUSSION
A. GENERAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES
1. What is a Crisis?
A crisis can be defined as any event that may or does bring a
Company under attack by regulators, prosecutors, the press,
analysts, or its investors. It is any event that could negatively af-
fect the credibility or reputation of that Company. These events
may come from a variety of sources. One source could be "bad
behavior," such as sexual harassment by employees or self-deal-
ing by board members. Another source could be antitrust viola-
tions. A third could be large-scale tax violations. Finally,
another crisis source might be a catastrophic event involving, or
even caused by, a product that was manufactured, installed, or
maintained by the Company.' Moreover, a crisis in one area
often leads to a "vicious circle" of crises in the other areas.4
2. What are the Possible (Extreme) Harms Resulting From a Crisis ?
Generally speaking, a crisis can create two types of significant
damage. The first may be significant damage to the Company
itself, even potentially threatening the Company's very exis-
tence. The second may be significant career or reputation dam-
age to individual members of the Company's senior
management or board of directors.
There are a range of events arising from a crisis that would
have an immediate impact on the Company, its management,
and its board. These could include, but are not limited to:
(1) Regulatory investigations and related enforcement ac-
tions with the possibility of significant civil penalties or
future increased regulatory oversight.
(2) Civil lawsuits commenced by a regulatory body or by pri-
vate citizens seeking enforcement of the applicable
regulations.
(3) Personal injury lawsuits, or other lawsuits sounding in
tort, brought by individuals or class actions seeking signif-
icant monetary damages.
3 See CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 5-9; see also Gary G. Lynch, Ten Commandments
of Corporate Crisis Control, 1053 PRAc. LAw INST., CORP. 239, 242-43 (May 1998).
4 See OGRZEK & GUILLERY, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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(4) Criminal investigations and resulting indictments by lo-
cal, state, and federal authorities against the Company it-
self and its officers and employees.
Some, all, or none of these events could occur, other events
could occur, and they all could happen sequentially or
simultaneously.5
3. What is Success in Dealing with a Crisis?
Success in dealing with a crisis can be defined as navigating
through the crisis as quickly and efficiently as possible while lim-
iting damage to the Company.6 But the Company needs to be
realistic. Seldom is a crisis a positive experience for a Company
or the individuals involved, and it is highly unlikely that the
Company will somehow be able to turn a crisis into a corporate
achievement.7 With proper planning and implementation, how-
ever, both the short- and long-term effects of a crisis can be sig-
nificantly mitigated.
4. A Process Overview: How Does a Company Prepare for a Crisis?
First and foremost, a Company successfully prepares for a cri-
sis by initiating and fully supporting formalized crisis manage-
ment planning at the highest levels of the organization and with
the active involvement of the Counsel.' This is basic. Without
taking the initial step of beginning a formalized planning effort,
high-level support of this effort, and attention to privilege and
5 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 11-16.
6 See Lynch, supra note 3, at 244.
7 See id. But consider Jeffery R. Caponigro, who takes a somewhat different
view: "Believe me, I'm not saying a business should want a crisis to occur. But
there are times when a crisis can be beneficial to a business." CAPONIGRO, supra
note 1, at 24. The author then goes on to list a number of "benefits" that a
business can experience during and after a crisis, such as increased visibility and
name recognition, an opportunity to show competency and leadership, improved
relationships, and the ability to make necessary changes. See id. at 24-26. But
many of these benefits can accrue through the crisis planning process without
the crisis ever occurring, which is arguably the best result of all. Thus, I think the
best approach is to plan vigorously for a crisis, assuming, for extra incentive, that
an actual crisis would not be a positive experience, and then to capitalize on the
benefits that the planning process itself affords.
8 See, e.g., Fredric S. Newman, Coordinating Legal, PR Aspects of a Product Liability
Crisis, 15 No. 3 PROD. LAB. L. & STRAT. 1, 3 ("It is imperative that any planning
and training effort be mandated by a company's chief executive officer, who
should establish an operational, executive, crisis management group."); see also
CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 99, 103-04.
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other legal issues, the Company cannot and will not be ade-
quately prepared for a crisis.
Second, it stands to reason that the best way to prepare for a
crisis is to work aggressively to stop one from happening in the
first place. If a significant crisis can threaten the very existence
of a Company, then the time and resources spent forestalling
preventable crises may well save the Company in the long
term.10
That being said, the Company needs to realize that not all
crises are preventable and that at least one is likely to happen
during the life of the Company. Thus, a Company should follow
two very basic steps in order to prepare for and deal with a crisis:
(1) Create a Crisis Management Team (the "Team"); and
(2) Use the Team to:
(a) Aggressively search out and address "preventable" cri-
ses, and
(b) Create contingency plans-the Crisis Management
Plan or "Plan"-to deal with the non-preventable
crises.11
In turning to the details, however, there appear to be as many
ways to conduct this crisis management planning as there are
crisis management planning commentators. But keeping in
mind the goals described above-the creation of a planning out-
line with an eye to Counsel's role in an aviation-industry envi-
ronment-this article teases out a path that is logical, inclusive,
and flexible.
9 As one author notes, one critical step in crisis planning is to make it clear
which executive is responsible. "It won't get done unless someone is clearly
named as the person responsible for making it happen." CAPONIGRO, supra note
1, at 100.
10 See CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 78 (in many cases crises can be prevented or
at least mitigated); COOMBS, supra note 1, at 17 ("The best way to manage a crisis
is to prevent it"); see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, When Bad Things
Happen to Good Companies: A Crisis Management Primer, 1149 PRAc. L. INST., CORP.
307, 316 (1999) (stating that a legal crises arising out of corporate crises may well
"threaten the very existence of the corporations they beleaguer").
11 The commentators are of one mind on the importance of forming some
type of crisis management team as a first step in preparing to respond to a crisis,
and to the extent they go beyond merely addressing crises that have already oc-
curred, they recognize the value in working to prevent crises as another early step
in crisis management. See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 100; COOMBS, supra
note 1, at 17; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra note 1, at 86 (calling the team a "crisis
unit"); Newman, supra note 8, at 3; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 317.
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First, the Team, in conjunction with senior management and
Counsel, can conduct a "master planning process" that lays the
groundwork for the overall Plan. This includes creating privi-
lege guidelines, identifying and minimizing-if not eliminat-
ing-crisis sources, identifying key stakeholders, and so forth.
Then, if and where appropriate, the Team can break down into
specifically tailored subgroups to conduct "subplanning" that is
more focused on particular issues. For example, this subplan-
ning could include (1) notification and implementation plan-
ning, (2) public affairs planning, and (3) legal response and
internal investigation planning.
And once the Team, as a whole or in its subgroups, has cre-
ated these plans, it must then be prepared to implement them.
This typically involves dissemination of guidelines to the appro-
priate employees, practice drills of the plans followed by appro-
priate plan revisions, and the occasional review and update of
the plans as time passes. Finally, the Team will be responsible
for post-Crisis critique if and when one becomes appropriate. 12
B. ISSUES SPECIFIC To AVIATION COMPANIES
1. Focus Here: Potential Aviation Disasters
As previously noted, a Company crisis may come in many
forms. The focus here will be on a crisis resulting from an air-
craft disaster that involves the Company's aviation business.
2. Unique Issues
a. Who is the Customer?
The Company must clearly understand who its customers are.
If the Company is a private operator of aircraft or is a small air
carrier, then the customer is either the aircraft owner and its
passengers or the flying public. If the Company is in the busi-
ness of manufacturing, installing or maintaining parts on those
12 All of the commentators I have cited so far recognize most, if not all, of
these elements, although not necessarily in this order. My proposed process
does, however, mirror that put forward by Jeffrey R. Copanigro, who created a
never-ending or circular process that includes: (1) identifying and assessing the
Company's vulnerabilities; (2) preventing crises from occurring that can be pre-
vented; (3) planning for the crises that cannot be prevented; (4) recognizing that
a crisis has occurred; (5) communicating during and after the crisis; and (6)
monitoring, evaluating and making adjustments to the plans as necessary. See
CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 17-18 (identifying each basic step; the remainder of
book then expands on each element listed).
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aircraft, then the Company's direct customers are the air carri-
ers that use those parts rather than the general public. That is,
it is the aircraft operators that make the decision of whether to
install and keep one of the Company's products on its aircraft.
That being said, in such a case the general public's view of the
safety of the Company's products could arguably have a signifi-
cant impact on the aircraft operators' decisions to install or
maintain those parts on their aircraft in the first place.
b. Who Bears Most of the Burdens?
Because aircraft operators such as in-house flight departments
or small air carriers are the Companies that directly conduct ei-
ther private or common carriage (and thus operate or carry a
non-aircraft-operator Company's devices), those Companies will
be on the front line of crisis response should an aviation disaster
occur. Thus, the aircraft operators will have the most direct reg-
ulatory burdens, most notably the burden of initially notifying
and dealing with the appropriate federal aviation regulatory
agencies in the aftermath of an aircraft accident or incident.
But note that this may also place the non-aircraft-operator Com-
pany in the position of potentially becoming a "scapegoat." If
such a Company does not immediately become actively involved
in the post-disaster process as much as it can, it could find itself
in the unhappy position of being directly or indirectly blamed
for the disaster, regardless of the actual facts.
c. Whose Law Will Apply?
Another important factor in a Company's crisis management
planning process, for aircraft operators and non-operators alike,
is that it may face legal action in a multitude of jurisdictions.
Because a Company's aircraft, or its products that are installed
or maintained on the aircraft, may be operated literally any-
where, a disaster implicating the Company could happen any-
where. This in turn means that a lawsuit might be filed against
the Company anywhere. While the aircraft disaster's location by
itself would not necessarily have a significant impact on any re-
sulting federal actions,13 it could have a significant impact on
13 For example, Federal Aviation Administration regulatory enforcement ac-
tions will be governed by the same statute-the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, et seq., (1994)-and its related enforcement regu-




any state or local litigation because of the variance in state and
local personal-injury and criminal laws. 14
3. Definitions and Acronyms
This article will use the following definitions and acronyms
throughout the discussion of the crisis management planning
process, with the goal of using terminology that is commonly
used in the aviation industry:
Air Carrier or Carrier Any person or corporate entity-here a
Company-who undertakes to engage in intrastate, interstate,
overseas, or foreign air transportation, or transportation of mail
by aircraft, i.e., the intrastate, interstate, overseas, or foreign car-
riage by aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for
compensation or hire, or the carriage of mail by aircraft in com-
merce.1 5 Note that all Aircraft Operators (defined below) gen-
erally will be referred to in the remainder of this article as "Air
Carriers," recognizing that there is a substantial body of such
operators who provide flight services that are not for compensa-
tion or hire, such as in-house flight departments that conduct 14
C.F.R. Part 91 aircraft operations for their corporate aircraft
owners pursuant to Subpart F of Part 91, because the principles
discussed below generally apply to both classes of operators
equally.
Aircraft. Any aircraft operated by an Air Carrier that has in-
stalled on it one of the Company's Devices (as defined below).16
Aircraft Accident. Any "occurrence associated with the opera-
tion [(as defined below)] of an aircraft which takes place be-
tween the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention
of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which
any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the air-
14 As one aviation-law practitioner's guide notes:
Jurisdiction, venue and choice of law issues are often paramount in
aviation cases. Often the victim or decedent is from one state, the
aircraft may have been owned, maintained or hangared in another
state, the flight originated in a third state, the crash occurred in a
fourth state, and the aircraft, engine or component at issue was de-
signed in a fifth state and manufactured, sold rebuilt or shipped
from a sixth or seventh state. It can be a maze, and you, the attor-
ney, are in its midst.
David I. Katzman & John D. McClune, Preparation for a General Aviation Product
Liability Action: A Plaintiffs Perspective, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE 9, 14
(A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec., Desmond T. Barry, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1998).
15 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2000).
16 See id.
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craft receives substantial damage."17 An example of an Aircraft
Accident could be an in-flight Aircraft cabin fire that leads to
substantial damage to the Aircraft, or that seriously or fatally in-
jures any of the passengers or crewmembers on board the
Aircraft.
Aircraft Incident Any "occurrence other than an [aircraft] acci-
dent, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects
or could affect the safety of operations."' 8 An example of an
Aircraft Incident would be an Aircraft cabin fire occurring while
the Aircraft is on the ground and undergoing maintenance that
either (1) indicates that such a fire could also occur while the
Aircraft is being used for flight operations, or that (2) causes
substantial damage to the Aircraft or serious or fatal injuries to a
person working on the Aircraft. 9
Aircraft Operator or Operator "[A] ny person [or corporate en-
tity] who causes or authorizes[, with or without the right of legal
control,] the operation of an aircraft, such as the owner, lessee,
or bailee of an aircraft. 20
Aircraft Operation(s) or Operation(s): The use, or to cause the
use, of the "aircraft for the purpose... of air navigation includ-
ing the piloting of [the] aircraft, with or without the right of
legal control (as owner, lessee, or otherwise). 21
Aviation Disaster Any Aircraft Accident or Aircraft Incident,
occurring on an Aircraft in which the Company has installed or
maintains any Device, that has the potential to lead to a Crisis.
Counsel: The General Counsel's office for the Company.
Cr/sis. Any Aviation Disaster that has the potential to impact
the Company's image or operations significantly, or to pose sig-
nificant economic or legal liability on the Company.
Crisis Management Plan, Plan, or CMP A set of procedures, gen-
erally composed of several subplans, tables, and guidelines ad-
17 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1999).
18 Id.
19 This example does not technically constitute an Aircraft Incident because
maintenance conducted on the Aircraft while it parked and not being used for
"air navigation" does not fit within a narrow reading of the definition of "aircraft
operation." However, such a scenario will be treated here as constituting an Air-
craft Incident both because it presents a more conservative approach for the task
at hand, and because any incident that could indicate that a safety issue exists
with the eventual operation of the aircraft will tend to draw regulatory review by
either the Federal Aviation Administration or the National Transportation Safety
Board, whether or not it fits the NTSB's strict definition of an Aircraft Incident.
20 49 C.F.R. § 830.2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
21 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
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dressing specific areas of expertise, to be implemented by the
Company in the event of a Crisis.
Crisis Management Team, Team, or CMT: The group of specifi-
cally identified Company employees that will create and imple-
ment the CMP in the event of a Crisis.
Device. Any product manufactured or sold by a Company that
is not an Air Carrier and that the Company installs or maintains
on an Aircraft.
Company: A company that either operates Aircraft, or manu-
facturers, installs, or maintains Devices for those Aircraft or the
Aircraft itself.
DOT: The United States Department of Transportation.
Fatal Injury: "[A]ny injury which results in death within 30
days of the [aircraft] accident. 22
FAA: The United States Federal Aviation Administration.
NTSB: The United States National Transportation Safety
Board.
Serious Injury: "[A] ny injury which: (1) requires hospitalization
for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the
date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone
(except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes se-
vere hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) in-
volves any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-
degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the
body surface. 23
Substantial Damage. "[Any] damage or failure which adversely
affects the structural strength, performance, or flight character-
istics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major
repair or replacement of the affected component. Engine fail-
ure or damage limited to an engine if only one engine fails or is
damaged, bent fairings or cowlings, dented skin, small puncture
holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller
blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine
accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered "substantial
damage" for the purposes of [49 C.F.R. part 380]."24
22 49 C.F.R. § 830.2.
23 49 C.F.R. § 830.2.
24 Id.
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III. THE MASTER PLANNING PROCESS
This subpart provides a detailed discussion of the planning
process that Counsel and the Company may wish to follow in
order to develop a CMP.
A. COUNSEL'S ROLE
One of the primary purposes of any crisis management plan-
ning is the mitigation, if not elimination, of potential legal crises
that can face the Company in the aftermath of a Crisis.2 5 There-
fore, Counsel should organize and conduct, to the appropriate
extent, the CMP planning process once it has been initiated by
the highest level of management.
One of the major benefits of this approach is that it may allow
for the attachment of the attorney-client privilege-and post-
Crisis, the work product doctrine-to much of the CMP plan-
ning process and implementation. 26 But these can be danger-
ous waters to tread.
1. Privilege Issues
Privilege issues will arise should regulatory investigations com-
mence, or civil or criminal lawsuits appear after an aviation dis-
aster occurs. Should state-law-based personal injury or criminal
25 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 247; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at
316-17. For a detailed discussion on the changing nature of general counsel's
role in assisting a Company in reducing its potential legal liabilities, see Richard
S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs, 46 Emory L.J. 1113
(1997), This article does not discuss crisis management planning per se, but the
parallels to the material discussed above-especially as to preventative steps
taken as part of the planning process-are significant:
The activities of general counsel in corporate organizations are changing in
response to increasing demands for corporate law compliance and expanding
knowledge about how to effectively manage law compliance in organizational set-
tings. These changes are altering the work of general counsel in two key respects.
First, the efforts of many general counsel are shifting from incident-specific activi-
ties-such as shaping the legal aspects of major corporate transactions or re-
sponding to legal claims against corporate clients-towards greater efforts to
identify and reduce the legal risks raised by ongoing corporate actions. Second,
in tandem with this new focus upon ongoing legal risks, corporate general coun-
sel is becoming increasingly sophisticated in recommending the use of organiza-
tional management techniques for preventing or minimizing legal liability of
corporate organizations.
Id. at 1113-14.
26 See Gruner, supra note 25, at 1177-78 ("Evaluations of corporate compliance
and liability prepared by or under the direction of corporate counsel may be
shielded from outside scrutiny under the attorney-client privilege.").
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lawsuits arise, the attorney-client privilege most likely will be de-
fined by the state in which the suits are filed. But, as noted
above, an aviation disaster can occur in any state, so it is difficult
to specify the particular privileges that the Company could
face. 27 There is arguably enough similarity in most states' ap-
proaches to the attorney-client privilege, however, that some ba-
sic principles can be defined. Furthermore, these general
principles often track the federal law on privilege.28
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege
In short, the federal common law attorney-client privilege be-
longs to the client, generally lasts as long as the client asserts it
(absent waiver or an exception), and protects confidential com-
munications between an attorney and a client for the purpose of
enabling the lawyer to render legal advice. 29 Broken down by its
elements, in order for a corporation to invoke the attorney-cli-
ent privilege under federal common law there must be:
A client. Under the first requirement that there be a client, a
corporation-just as an individual client-can assert the
privilege.3"
An attorney engaged to render legal advice or assistance. The pur-
pose of the communication must be the rendering of legal ad-
vice or assistance, and it must be a lawyer that is ultimately
giving that advice." The lawyer may be either inside counsel or
outside counsel, but for internal counsel the client must take
great care to separate that lawyer's legal functions from his or
her other functions, particularly those of an administrative, busi-
ness, or other non-legal nature. Courts do not necessarily auto-
matically uphold the privilege simply because an attorney is
conducting or supervising a particular task. Rather, they tend to
27 See the discussion on choice of law issues in aviation accidents, supra note 14
and accompanying text.
28 For a detailed discussion of the attorney-client privilege as it applies to cor-
porations, see JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATIrORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE
(2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1999). Another good source of information on a variety of
attorney-client privilege issues is ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION,
PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY (A.B.A. Tort and Ins. Prac. Sect.,
Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 2d ed. 1997).
29 See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982); 6
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.49[1] (3d ed. 1999).
See also Gruner, supra note 25, at 1178.
30 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981); GERGACZ, supra
note 28, 2.01 at 2-3; see also Gruner, supra note 25, at 1177-78.
31 See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1994).
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scrutinize assertions of privilege relating to communications
from in-house lawyers to management, particularly when the
lawyer is also an executive. Thus, the Company needs to (1)
document clearly that the endeavor has a primarily legal pur-
pose, and (2) distinguish between the legal and purely business
objective of that endeavor. 2
A communication. The privilege only attaches to communica-
tions between the attorney and the client, or among their repre-
sentatives. 3 Thus, it does not protect from disclosure any
underlying or preexisting facts or information not related to the
confidential issue at hand. 4
The possible pairings of persons whose communications may
be privileged include: (1) the client or his representative and
the attorney or the attorney's representative; (2) the attorney
and the attorney's representative; (3) the client or his attorney
with an attorney representing the client on another matter of
common interest; and (4) the client and the client's representa-
2 GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02[2] [a] at 3-14 to 3-15.
Gruner stresses this point in his article, noting that:
Establishing corporate attorney-client privilege concerning compli-
ance program communications may involve several problems. At
minimum, counsel must have substantial involvement in compli-
ance efforts before the attorney-client privilege is even arguably ap-
plicable. If counsel neither directs nor conducts a compliance
evaluation, then the evaluation findings are unlikely to qualify for
the privilege.
Similarly, if counsel is involved in a compliance review but acts
only as a fact finder or source of business advice, there is little
chance that the privilege will apply. In order for the privilege to
attach, the objective of a compliance investigation or evaluation
must be the rendering of legal advice, including assessments of:
(1) anticipated litigation, grounds for corporate liability and the
probable scope of such liability;
(2) the need for public disclosures concerning detected miscon-
duct and the appropriate contents of such disclosures;
(3) the appropriate handling of whistleblower reports and inter-
nal sanctions against wrongdoers; and
(4) steps to prevent a recurrence of illegal conduct.
Gruner, supra note 25, at 1178. Note that Gruner's article focuses on compliance
reviews, which is roughly analogous to the first part of the crisis management
process of locating and eliminating potential crisis sources. His article does not
focus on the second part, planning to respond to crises that cannot be elimi-
nated. Thus, to this extent his arguments do not necessarily provide guidance on
how the privilege may apply to this second step.
33 Bieter, 16 F.3d at 936.
34 See GERCACZ, supra note 28, 3.02[2] [b]-[c], 3-32 to 3-48.
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tive.35 Where the client is an individual person it is usually easy
to determine if such a pairing exists. But when the client is a
corporation, the question becomes who at that corporation qual-
ifies as the "client" for the purposes of attaching the attorney-
client privilege?
In 1981 the United States Supreme Court rejected the com-
monly used answer to this question-the "control group" test-
in Upjohn Co. v. United States.36 There the Court instead found
that, on the facts in that particular case, communications by cer-
tain individuals were privileged because, in general terms: (1)
supervisory personnel directed those corporate employees to
make the communications to corporate counsel, (2) the com-
munications concerned matters within the scope of the em-
ployee's duties, and (3) the employees were aware that the
information was being sought in order to secure legal advice.
The Supreme Court did not adopt these elements as a new test
to replace the control group test, specifically leaving the scope
of this issue to be developed on a case-by-case basis. 8 But the
federal courts have effectively adopted this version of a "subject
matter test" for deciding who in the corporation qualifies as the
client for the purposes of analyzing whether the privilege exists.
Intent that the communication be confidential. The communica-
tion itself must be confidential. The Company must intend that
the communication be confidential when made and then must
treat it accordingly, or the privilege may be inadvertently
waived. 9 In order to avoid waiver, the Company should take
steps such as the following:
" Documents created in the planning process should be
clearly marked "Privileged & Confidential: Do Not
Reproduce."
" Counsel should advise all document recipients of the plan-
ning process's confidential nature and the consequences of
inadvertent production. Counsel should also keep in mind
that the more widespread the dissemination of the confi-
dential material, the greater the risk of waiver.
" Copies of all documents that the Company decides to keep
confidential should be numbered so that they can be
35 See Bieter, 16 F.3d at 935.
36 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
37 See id. at 390-91.
- See id. at 396-97.
- See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 1 3.02[2] [d], at 3-48 to 3-53.
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tracked, and employees should be instructed to not make
additional copies of those documents.
* Documents generated by employees should state that they
have been produced at the direction of counsel and have
been designed for use by lawyers to assist them in rendering
legal advice to the Company.
* If and when the documents must be given to a third party,
the corporation should consider obtaining a confidentiality
agreement ensuring, among other things, that the materials
are not forwarded to other parties.
* Counsel should brief employees to be sensitive to the possi-
bility that otherwise privileged conversations may be taped
or overheard without the speaker's knowledge. For exam-
ple, employees should be careful of conversations involving
speakerphones, because they may be overheard by third
parties of whom the employees are not aware.
" Employees should also recognize that communications by
voicemail or electronic mail must often be produced in
discovery.4 °
Summary-attorney-client privilege. All of the elements and is-
sues discussed above can be condensed into what the commen-
tators have recognized are important factors for determining
whether a particular document or communication is protected
by the attorney-client privilege. These can include:
" Were the communications made by corporate employees to
corporate counsel or outside counsel upon order of superi-
ors in order to secure legal advice from counsel?
" Was the information needed by corporate or outside coun-
sel to formulate legal advice not available to or known by
upper level management?
" Was the information communicated concerning matters
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties?
* Were the employees aware that the reason for the commu-
nication with counsel was so that the corporation could ob-
tain legal advice?
" Were the communications ordered to be kept confidential,
and were they in fact kept confidential?
40 See id. Also note Gruner's admonition that in some cases "privilege protec-
tions may be waived by disclosures of compliance reports to public agencies."
Gruner, supra note 25, at 1179.
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* What are the identity and resources of the party seeking dis-
closure of the privileged material?41
b. The Work Product Doctrine
Counsel should also review the potential applicability of the
work product doctrine. The federal doctrine is a qualified im-
munity belonging to both the client and the attorney that pro-
tects from discovery documents and tangible things prepared in
anticipation of litigation by a party or its representatives.42 The
doctrine was originally a common-law immunity created to pro-
tect trial preparation materials that could reveal an attorney's
evaluations and strategy about the case.43 It is now codified in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3).
Rule 26(b) (3) provides that, other than for materials pre-
pared by a testifying expert, a party can only discover documents
or tangible things that a second party, or the second party's rep-
resentative, created in anticipation of litigation or for trial upon
the first party's showing that it has a substantial need for the
materials in the preparation of its own case and that it is unable,
without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. Furthermore, if the court does
order the discovery of such materials, it must protect against dis-
closure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or le-
gal theories of an attorney or other representative of the second
party concerning the litigation.44
Anticipation of litigation; duration of the immunity. Generally a
party can rely on the doctrine for documents created before the
lawsuit was actually filed, but in that case the documents had to
have been created in anticipation of some litigation and would
41 GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02 [3] [b] [iii], at 3-74 to 3-76. By way of compari-
son of these "factors-to-consider" under the federal privilege to a state-defined
form of the privilege, in Texas the test is that a representative of the client, for
the purposes of the attorney-client privilege for a corporation, can be either: (1)
A person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice
thereby rendered, on behalf of the corporate client, or (2) Any other person
who, for the purpose of effectuating legal representation for the client, makes or
receives a confidential communication while acting within the scope of employ-
ment of the corporate client. Tex. R. Evid. 503 (2000).
42 See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th
Cir. 1989).
43 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); GERGACZ, supra note 28,
1 7.01, at 7-4.
44 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) (2000); see also GERGACZ, supra note 28,
7.02[1], at 7-12 to 7-35.
2001]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not have been created but for that possibility.45 And once it has
attached, the immunity generally extends beyond the original
litigation, including to any subsequent litigation. There is a split
in the federal circuits, however, as to whether material prepared
for one case may be protected under the doctrine in a subse-
quent unrelated case.46
Note also that materials created in the ordinary course of bus-
iness, pursuant to regulatory requirements, or for other non-liti-
gation reasons are not prepared in anticipation of litigation.4 7
Opinion vs. ordinary work product. The rule accords special
treatment to "opinion" work product. Opinion work product
consists of the attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories. 48 Examples of opinion work product in-
clude: (1) the attorney's notes, including purely factual notes;49
(2) documents reflecting case strategies and evaluations;50 (3)
compilations of documents where acknowledging the compila-
tion would disclose the attorney's mental impressions and
thought processes;51 and (4) the attorney's litigation file, includ-
ing the organization of that file.52 The federal circuit courts'
general consensus appears to be that opinion work product en-
joys very strong protection from disclosure. 3
45 See United States v. Adiman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195, 1203-04 (2d Cir. 1998); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997).
46 See, e.g., Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 703 (10th Cir.
1998); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 732
(4th Cir. 1974) (holding that doctrine immunity protects opinion work product
even after suit for which it was prepared has ended); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 43 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting split but declining to decide one
way or the other).
47 See 1979 Notes of Adv. Comm. To Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3); Martin v. Bally's
Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260-61 (3d Cir. 1993).
48 FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(3).
49 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399-400; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
(1947).
50 See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1015
(1st Cir. 1988).
51 See, e.g., Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (8th Cir.
1986); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316-17 (3d Cir. 1985).
52 See, e.g., In re San Juan, 859 F.2d at 1015.
53 See, e.g., Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422, as modified,
30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that crime-fraud exception is one of the
"rare and extraordinary circumstances" in which opinion work product is discov-
erable); Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir.
1992) (not absolute when representative's impressions and opinions are placed
at issue in the case and a compelling need for the material exists).
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Ordinary work product includes other trial preparation
materials that do not disclose impressions or opinions. Exam-
ples of ordinary work product include: (1) nonparty witness
statements; 54 (2) individual pieces of evidence that reflect an at-
torney's selection of only certain information;5 5 and (3) the pre-
mature creation or production of exhibit lists.56 Ordinary work
product is entitled to only qualified protection. Another party
may discover it if the party can show a substantial need for the
materials and an inability to otherwise obtain it without undue
hardship.57 Finally, note that collections of evidence that do not
evince any creative or analytic input from a party's attorney do
not qualify as work product, either opinion or ordinary, and
therefore are not immune from disclosure under the work prod-
uct doctrine.5"
Ownership, waiver and the crime-fraud exception. It is generally
accepted that, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine immunity belongs to both the client and the
attorney, and either may therefore assert it. Furthermore, the
client's waiver of the immunity therefore does not necessarily
waive the attorney's immunity, and vice versa.59
Work product doctrine immunity can be waived. Waiver oc-
curs if the attorney fails to timely assert the immunity, or if the
covered material is intentionally disclosed to a third party.6"
This being said, because the immunity serves the purpose of
protecting the material from disclosure to an adversary, disclo-
sure to a non-adversarial third party will only result in waiver if
54 See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509-12. Note that even though a witness state-
ment will usually be protected as ordinary work product, a witness may obtain a
copy of any statement he/she made without having to show a substantial need or
undue hardship. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
55 See, e.g., In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig.,
860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1988) (computer tape reflecting counsel's selection of
certain information considered ordinary work product).
56 See, e.g., In re San Juan, 859 F.2d at 1018-19.
57 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
58 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3); Riddell Sports, Inc. v. Brooks, 158 F.R.D.
555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
59 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994); In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But see Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 866 (3d Cir. 1994) (the immunity
belongs to the attorney, not the client).
60 See, e.g., Norton v. Caremark, Inc., 20 F.3d 330, 339 (8th Cir. 1994).
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that disclosure enables an adversary to subsequently gain access
to it.61
One exception to the work product doctrine is the "crime-
fraud" exception; the immunity does not apply to material re-
lated to the commission of a crime or fraud.62 But this excep-
tion may not apply to materials created after the client's alleged
wrongdoing has ended.63
c. Summary: Counsel Should Conduct an Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine Review
One of Counsel's first duties as part of the CMP planning pro-
cess will be to use the attorney-client privilege factors listed
above, and the work product doctrine to the extent it may apply
to post-Crisis legal activity, to determine the scope of privilege
that the Company may potentially seek to apply as a result of the
planning process. This will then allow Counsel to provide
guidelines for the CMT, and the Company's employees as a
whole, to follow during Crisis planning and response.
In crafting privilege and work-product guidelines for the
CMT, arguably the best position to take is to seek to apply the
privileges as widely as possible-although not so widely as to
clearly violate or lose all privilege-but also to anticipate that
some or all of the privileged materials will be waived or inadver-
tently produced at some point. In other words, Counsel should
plan for invoking the privilege, but also instruct the Company's
employees that everything they write down may, and potentially
will, be seen by a jury at some point.
2. Aviation Industry Legal Issues
A central element to the attachment of the attorney-client
privilege is that the communication must be made for the pur-
poses of rendering legal advice. Counsel should therefore con-
duct the CMP planning process with an eye toward the various
legal liabilities the Company could face in the aftermath of a
Crisis. Below is an outline of three general categories of legal
liabilities a Company in the aviation industry may face as a con-
61 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
62 See, e.g., In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1987).
63 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
526
CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANNING
sequence of an aviation disaster: (1) regulatory liabilities, (2)
civil litigation liabilities, and (3) criminal liabilities.
a. Regulatory Liabilities
The Company may face regulatory investigations and poten-
tial regulatory enforcement actions in the aftermath of a Crisis.
Although some states have administrative regulations that could
apply, this arena has been largely preempted by the federal gov-
ernment, so the federal law is the focus of this review.
Sources of Authority.
The statute that primarily governs the aviation industry in the
United States is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended
(the "Act"). The Act is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101,
et seq. (1994). The Act provides regulatory promulgation au-
thority for two of the agencies that most directly impact the avia-
tion industry: (1) the Department of Transportation; the DOT's
aviation-related regulations, the Aviation Economic Regulations
or "AERs," are primarily found at 14 C.F.R. Parts 200-400
(1999); and (2) the Federal Aviation Administration; the FAA's
regulations, the Federal Aviation Regulations or "FARs," are pri-
marily found at 14 C.F.R. Parts 1-199 (1999). A third agency
that has significant impact on the aviation industry is the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, which exists under the au-
thority of 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. (1994), and whose aviation-
related regulations are primarily found at 49 C.F.R. Parts 830,
831, and 845 (1999).
All of these regulations create a broad range of compliance
duties for any person or Company whose actions touch upon
the aviation industry.64
- For example, but without limitation, any Company manufacturing aircraft
products and parts must comply with the applicable FARs in 14 C.F.R. Part 21;
any Company conducting maintenance, preventative maintenance, rebuilding or
alteration operations on aircraft parts or equipment must comply with the appli-
cable FARs in 14 C.F.R. Part 43; any individual seeking certification as an airmen
or mechanic must comply with the applicable FARs in 14 C.F.R. Parts 61, 63, 65,
or 67; all U.S. aircraft must be registered pursuant to the FARs in 14 C.F.R, Part
47; all aircraft operations must be operated under one, if not more, of the appli-
cable FARs' operational Parts, typically either Part 91, 121 or 135; all air carriers
must receive economic authority, or operate under an exemption from the need
for such authority, from DOT and comply with the applicable AERs such as Parts
201, 206, 296, 298 or 380; if a Company's certificated operation involves the oper-
ation of aircraft by a foreign air carrier then DOT's AERs in 14 C.F.R. Part 375
are invoked; if an Aircraft Accident or Incident occurs, then the NTSB's regula-
tions in 49 C.F.R. Part 831 are invoked; and so forth. And persons or companies
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Types of Action.
(a) Investigations
(i) DOT and FAA Responsibilities
The DOT and FAA have broad investigative powers under
their various regulations. For example, 14 C.F.R. Part 13 pro-
vides that the FAA has the authority to "conduct investigations,
hold hearings, issue subpoenas, require the production of rele-
vant documents, records and property, and take evidence and
depositions. '6 5 Likewise, 14 C.F.R. Parts 302 and 305 outline the
DOT's extensive investigative authority pertaining to any poten-
tial violations of their regulations.
(ii) NTSB Responsibilities
The NTSB's primary aviation function is to conduct investiga-
tions and make determinations of facts, conditions, circum-
stances, and the cause or probable cause of all accidents
involving civil aircraft.66 It is the NTSB that is charged with the
sole responsibility and authority of determining the "probable
cause" of Aircraft Accidents in the United States, even if the FAA
is conducting a concurrent investigation or assisting in the
NTSB's investigation.67
The NTSB's investigator-in-charge has the authority to desig-
nate parties to the investigation, but the parties must be limited
to "those persons, government agencies, companies, and as-
sociations whose employees, functions, activities, or products
were involved in the accident or incident and who can provide
suitable qualified technical personnel actively to assist in the in-
vestigation."68 Furthermore, no party "shall be represented in
any aspect of the NTSB investigation by any person who also
represents claimants or insurers. No party representative may
occupy a legal position ....
doing all of these things simultaneously must comply with all of the applicable
regulations simultaneously, plus any other FAA, DOT or NTSB rules that might
apply to the particular activity. In short, aviation regulatory oversight is extensive.
65 14 C.F.R. § 13.3 (2000).
66 See 49 C.F.R. § 800.3(a) (2000).
67 See id. § 831.2.
68 Id. § 831.11(a) (1).




The Aircraft Operator is the party having the regulatory bur-
den to report an Aircraft Accident or Incident.70 Thus, al-
though a particular aircraft part may be the cause of the
Accident or Incident, it is the Aircraft Operator-not the part's
manufacturer or maintainer-that has the duty to report such
an occurrence to the NTSB. The report may then trigger the
NTSB investigation noted above.
All persons, however, have a general duty to report any known
violation of the Act or the FAR's promulgated under the Act to
the FAA.71 Such a report could in turn trigger an investigation
by the FAA or DOT.
(b) Enforcement
In conjunction with DOT's and FAA's broad investigatory
powers, both agencies enjoy broad enforcement powers. DOT's
powers are primarily outlined in 14 C.F.R. Parts 302 and 305,
while the FAA's powers are largely defined in 14 C.F.R. Part 13,
subpart C-Legal Enforcement Actions.
The NTSB does not have any enforcement authority per se;
rather, it is primarily limited to conducting aircraft accident in-
vestigations and then making recommendations to the appro-
priate agencies, such as the FAA and DOT.72
Potential Outcomes.
(a) Civil Fines and Penalties
The Act and the applicable enforcing agency regulations give
DOT and FAA substantial authority to seek a broad range of civil
fines and penalties, which could easily climb into the tens of
thousands of dollars depending on the type and number of reg-
ulatory violations that occurred.73
Certificate Actions: In addition to civil fines and penalties, the
FAA has the authority to suspend or revoke any certificates it has
issued, such as airmen, aircraft operator, mechanics, or repair
station certificates.74 This could have a significant economic im-
70 See id. § 830.5.
71 See 14 C.F.R. § 13.1(a).
72 See 49 C.F.R. § 800.3.
73 See 49 U.S.C. ch. 463 (Enforcement and Penalties); 14 C.F.R. pt. 302 (DOT
regulations on enforcement and civil penalties); 14 C.F.R. pt. 13 (FAA regula-
tions on enforcement and civil penalties).
74 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 13, Subpart C.
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pact on any Company that requires its FAA certification in order
to continue its business.
NTSB Probable Cause Findings: Although the NTSB does not
have enforcement authority, it does have the authority to make
factual determinations and to issue the cause or probable cause
for any Aircraft Accident or Incident.75 More importantly, al-
though later administrative or civil tribunals are not allowed to
use these cause or probable cause findings to establish liability
against a party, 76 this quite often effectively happens, perhaps
due to the great weight accorded to these findings.77
b. Civil Litigation Liabilities
In addition to regulatory actions, the Company could also
face civil litigation liabilities, largely in the form of personal in-
jury lawsuits.
Sources of Authority.
Generally, there are no federal statutes that provide private
causes of action for Aircraft Accidents or Incidents. Such ac-
tions are typically based on state statutory and common law pro-
visions. Thus, which laws apply will largely depend on the
particular jurisdiction in which the Accident or Incident oc-
curs.78 This being said, there are three common types of causes
of action.
Types of Action.
Breach of contract: Depending on the nature of the Aircraft
Accident or Incident, an aviation Company that provides ser-
vices to Air Carriers, such as the installation and maintenance of
electronic equipment, may find that it faces potential allegations
that it has breached certain contractual provisions on the quality
of that equipment, etc.
General negligence: Aircraft Accidents or Incidents that lead
to the personal injury of employees or third parties may lead to
personal injury lawsuits alleging negligence against all parties re-
lated to the Aircraft Operation, running from the Air Carrier to
the manufacturer of sub-components used by the Air Carrier on
its Aircraft. 79 However, in the case of components manufactur-
7- See 49 C.F.R. § 800.3(a).
76 See 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1994).
77 See, e.g., 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 200 (1997).
78 For a discussion on choice of law issues in aviation accidents, see supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., 8A AM. JUg. 2D Aviation § 108 (1997).
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ers, indemnity clauses often exist in the contracts between those
manufactures and the Air Carriers that may shield the manufac-
turers from negligence-based lawsuits. 0
Products strict liability: Aircraft Accidents or Incidents that re-
sult in personal injuries may trigger actions brought under a
state's products liability laws, and in fact these types of actions
are more common than those based on general negligence."1
With respect to Companies that are not Air Carriers, while the
courts were initially less likely to apply indemnification and war-
ranty limitations to manufacturers under strict products liability
as they were under general negligence, it appears that these lim-
itations are becoming more enforceable.8 2
Potential Outcomes.
Various contractual relief: If a court finds that a manufacturer
has breached a contract related to an Aircraft Accident or Inci-
dent, then that manufacturer will face damages or other relief
that may be allowed under the contract or the laws of that
jurisdiction.
Significant personal injury damages: As with breached con-
tracts, a finding of liability under general negligence or strict
products liability will lead to damages or other relief. The signif-
icant difference is that personal injury damages typically far out-
pace contract damages, and may lead to millions of dollars, if
not more, in damages.
c. Criminal Litigation Liabilities
Although once considered rare, if not unheard of, " [i] t is be-
coming increasingly common for federal and state prosecutors
to seek criminal penalties against both companies and their
managers for violations of statutes and rules regulating conduct
of businesses. '' 83 Quite often those executives and managers are
80 See Frank A. Silane & Geneva A. Collins, Apportionment of Liability Between
Users and Manufacturers of Commercial Aircraft, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE 25,
25 (A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec., Desmond T. Barry, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1998).
1 See, e.g., 8A AM. JUR. 20 Aviation §§ 175-185 (1997); see also Silane & Collins,
supra note 80, at 26.
82 See, e.g., 8A AM. JuR. 2D Aviation §§ 184 (1997); Silane & Collins, supra note
80, at 26.
83 Margaret Graham Tebo, Guilty By Reason of Title, A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 44,
44.
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shocked to learn that they could spend time in prison for viola-
tions their companies commit while they are at the helm. 4
Sources of Authority.
Various state and local laws: Any of the jurisdictions in which
a Company works on or operates aircraft may, and probably will,
have a range of criminal statutes that could apply to the after-
math of an Aircraft Accident or Incident. Note that this could
conceivably include charges of manslaughter or analogous
crimes in some jurisdictions.8 5
Federal statutes: A number of federal criminal statutes have
been, or arguably could be, used against a Company involved
Aircraft Accidents or Incidents. These may include:
" General Criminal Law Statutes:
" The False Statement Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This stat-
ute prohibits a person or corporation from making, di-
rectly or indirectly, false statements regarding any matter
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, such as the
FAA, DOT, or NTSB.
" Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
These sections prohibit participation in schemes to de-
fraud by use of the mail or wires.
" Conspiracy Statute; 18 U.S.C. § 371. This statute prohib-
its agreements to commit an unlawful act.
" Transportation-Related Laws:
e Criminal Sanctions for Regulatory Failures:
84 See id. For a detailed treatment on corporate criminal liability and efforts to
mitigate that liability, see Richard S. Gruner, Reducing Corporate Criminal Liability
Through Post-Offense Responses, C800 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 159, 166 (1992) (published as
part of the ALI-ABA Course of Study entitled Organizing for Corporate Compliance:
Avoid Corporate Lawbreaking Through Preventive Lawyering) [hereinafter Gruner II].
85 See Tebo, supra note 83, at 44. The first three paragraphs of this article are
instructive, and eye-opening, for any aircraft parts manufacturer or service
provider:
When Valujet Flight 592 crashed in the Florida Everglades on
May 11, 1996, killing everyone on board, Daniel Gonzalez wasn't
there.
And when the oxygen canisters that caused the crash were misla-
beled and loaded into the plane's cargo hold in Miami, he wasn't
there, either.
Nevertheless, Gonzalez-who at the time of the crash was vice
president of SabreTech, Inc., an Orlando-based airline mainte-
nance firm-was charged with 110 counts of manslaughter. He was
charged also with unlawful transportation of hazardous waste, con-
spiracy and falsifying records, and faced up to 55 years in prison
and fines of more than $2.7 million if convicted.
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* 49 U.S.C. § 46505-Reporting and record keeping vio-
lations; it is a crime to intentionally fail to make or
keep a required report, alter a report, or file a false
report.
* 49 U.S.C. § 46312-Transporting hazardous material
("HAZMAT"); it is a crime to "willfully" improperly
transport HAZMAT.
* 49 U.S.C. § 46316-"catch all" criminal penalties; pro-
vides sanctions for the intentional and knowing viola-
tions of any FAA safety regulations, where such
violations are not already prohibited by another
statute.
e Destruction of Aircraft Provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 32-De-
struction of aircraft or aircraft facilities.
Types of Action.
Criminal indictments: As noted above, violations of these stat-
utes could lead to criminal penalties against the Company as a
business entity and criminal indictments against executive and
managers who are leading the Company. 6
Potential Outcomes.
Significant fines, incarceration, or both: Many of the statutes
listed above call for imprisonment of up to five years, fines, or
both for each violation of that statute. And, as noted above,
charges such as manslaughter brought under state statutes
could result in significantly longer periods of imprisonment and
greater fines."7 Finally, also note once again that these penalties
could apply with equal force to a Company executive or man-
ager who was not even directly involved in the Aircraft Accident
or the events leading up to that Accident.
B. CREATION OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM (CMT)
1. Pre-Crisis Creation, Planning and Implementation
a. Pre-Crisis Creation
Once crisis management planning has been initiated by se-
nior management and preliminarily organized through Coun-
sel's office, the next step is the creation of the initial Crisis
Management Team. The Team needs to be composed of per-
sons with adequate rank and expertise, which typically includes:
86 Id. at 44-45.
87 See discussion supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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legal expertise to address the legal strategies entwined in crisis
management; managerial experience necessary to handle em-
ployee issues; the engineering, scientific, and financial expertise
required to address the substance of the crisis; and a workable
system for dealing with relationships between the Company and
its customers and other "key stakeholders." Thus, at a mini-
mum, the team will typically include (to the extent each cate-
gory exists):
(1) The Company's senior officers or management represent-
atives. This should involve the highest level of manage-
ment personnel possible;
(2) The General Counsel and the General Counsel's staff;
(3) Senior financial representatives;
(4) Senior operations representatives;
(5) Senior public affairs representatives;
(6) Senior risk management personnel;
(7) Government and investor relations personnel;
(8) Internal quality and safety investigators; and
(9) Where appropriate, the Company's outside litigation
counsel. 88
b. Pre-Crisis Activity: Planning and Implementation
The CMT will have multiple functions, which may be broken
down into two general categories: Pre-Crisis planning and imple-
mentation and Post-Crisis implementation. Pre-Crisis planning
and implementation may include:
(1) Gathering the necessary information;
(2) Formulating the appropriate plans or subplanning
processes;
(3) Implementing those portions of the plans that can be put
into place before a crisis occurs (for example, Incident
notification policies, safety directives from senior man-
agement, and so forth);
(4) Periodically creating practice scenarios to test the imple-
mentation of the plans and then revising them as
necessary.8 9
88 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 102-24, 127-29, 135-36, 145; COOMBS,
supra note 1, at 63-70; OGRIZEK & GuILLERY, supra note 1, at 73-78.
89 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 102-24, 127-29, 135-36, 145; COOMBS,




The primary function of the CMT during Post-Crisis imple-
mentation is initially to review the Crisis and then direct the ac-
tual implementation of the plans as appropriate. Thus, as soon
as any personnel become aware of an event that may become a
Crisis for the Company, steps must be in place to make sure that
some member of the CMT is notified. Steps must be in place to
then:
(1) Initiate notification of the entire Team;
(2) Assess the need for additional team members;
(3) Initiate implementation of the appropriate plan(s);
(4) Manage the ongoing implementation of those plans for
the duration of the Crisis; and
(5) Eventually conduct a Post-Crisis critique."0
3. CMT Staff Support
One additional factor that cannot be ignored in the crisis
management planning process and the Post-Crisis implementa-
tion process is adequate support of the CMT. Senior level man-
agement must designate sufficient staffing and support
resources, from the very beginning of the planning process, who
will be dedicated to both supporting the CMT in its planning
process and, more importantly, assisting the CMT in the imple-
mentation of the plans after a Crisis has occurred. This will typi-
cally involve adequate secretarial support and personnel
assistance from each of the team members' Companies or sub-
groups. As the planning process progresses, the CMT can assess
this requirement and senior management can then assign per-
sonnel accordingly.9 1
C. THE MASTER PLANNING PROCESS
Once formed, the new CMT should follow a logical planning
process that will allow it to gather systematically and consider all
of the pertinent information necessary to create a balanced,
well-thought-out, and useful crisis management plan. The CMT
may therefore undertake tasks such as these:
9 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 102-24, 127-29, 135-36, 145; COOMBS,
supra note 1, at 63-70; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra note 1, at 73-78.
91 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 102-24, 127-29, 135-36, 145; COOMBS,
supra note 1, at 63-70; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra note 1, at 73-78. I provide
detailed lists in Part II of these materials for the supplies, etc., that the Company
should stockpile in anticipation of a Crisis.
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1. First Task: Identify Potential Crises
The first task of the newly formed CMT is to identify all of the
potential Crises that could arise from the Company's business
operations. 92 As noted above, the focus here will be on a poten-
tial aviation disaster that triggers a Crisis for the Company.
Generally, there are at least two general types of aviation disas-
ters or "events" that could lead to a Crisis for the Company. The
first is some type of event leading to the damage of an Aircraft
or injury to the Company's direct or contract personnel while
the Aircraft is not being used for revenue or flight Operations.
This could be an event such as a cabin fire that occurs while the
Aircraft is hangared and undergoing maintenance. This type of
event would arguably not tend to draw a great deal of general
public notice, but it could draw significant unwanted attention
from federal regulators or from state or local officials.
A second type of event could be an Aviation Accident or Inci-
dent that occurs while the Aircraft is being used for revenue Op-
erations. This aviation disaster could be calamitous for the
Company if the Company's Aircraft Operations, or one of the
Company's products, was linked to or allegedly the cause of the
Disaster. An example might be either negligent Aircraft Opera-
tion procedures, or maybe an Aircraft component failure caused
or exacerbated by a Device that occurs in flight, leading to the
injury or death of passengers on board the Aircraft. This type of
disaster would certainly draw attention from the general public;
attention from federal regulators; and, in the current climate,
attention from criminal prosecutors.
In either case, the CMT should consider a broad range of pos-
sibilities, conferring with the appropriate operations and in-
house safety personnel to determine what types of events are
most likely to occur and trigger a Crisis for the Company.93
2. Second Task: Find and Eliminate Crisis Sources
a. Find Potential Crisis Sources
The next task for the CMT, which can be accomplished in
conjunction with the first task, is to search for the potential
sources of the types of Crises it has just defined.94 For example,
if the CMT decides that one potential Crisis might be a cabin
92 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 42-56; COOMBS, supra note 1, at 17.
93 See, e.g., CAPONICRO, supra note 1, at 42-56; COOMBS, supra note 1, at 17-32.
94 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 63-74.
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fire that occurs while Devices are being installed, on an Aircraft,
the CMT should direct the appropriate operational personnel
to review the installation process to make sure that there is not
some obvious practice or factor that could lead to such a cabin
fire.
b. Create Processes to Eliminate Crisis Sources
As part of the process of finding potential Crisis sources, the
CMT should also coordinate with senior management to take
steps to eliminate them (if such systems are not already in
place) . Once again, there appear to be as many ways to do this
as there are crisis management planning commentators. But all
of these commentaries can arguably be boiled down to a three-
step process:
First, the Company should develop, implement, and docu-
ment a meaningful corporate code of conduct.96
Second, the Company should designate an office to which
employees and consumer concerns may be brought. This office
or officer should be a person senior enough and with enough
influence within the Company to ensure that each concern is
properly addressed and its resolution is documented.97
Third, the Company should create reporting guidelines for all
employees, listing the types of events that should be reported
and to whom they should be reported. These could range from
95 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 78-92; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra note
1, at 88 ("It is essential for a [C]ompany to know how to manage a crisis should
one arise, but it is preferable to know how to avoid one.").
96 See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 319.
At a time when the acts of a handful of employees can precipitate a
legal crisis affecting an entire organization, a company must make
its operating precepts clear to all employees. A corporate code of
conduct, in a variety of forms, represents the means by which a
company articulates the rules applicable to its industry and creates
the methodology to enforce those rules. These codes are devel-
oped with the aim of avoiding corporate crises.
Id. (citation omitted).
97 See id. at 320.
Many corporate crises do not come as a surprise. Often, they stem
from an organizational problem that was allowed to fester without
resolution. Therefore, every [C]ompany should identify one or
more high-level officers to whom an employee or any member of
the public can direct any legal concern regarding the [C]ompany's
operations, with assurances-at least in the case of employees-of
anonymity and freedom from retribution.
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an employee observing another employee's or supervisor's fail-
ure to comply with regulatory requirements, to an incident in-
volving the personal injury of a contract employee who is
working on the installation of a Device at an Air Carrier's facil-
ity, to an employee seeing a news report that a commercial air-
craft, either one of the Air Carrier's or one potentially carrying
one of the Company's Devices, has been involved in a cata-
strophic accident. 8
These three steps combined will hopefully lead to two results.
First, they will put into place a mechanism that will quickly pro-
vide critical information concerning potential Crisis sources to
officials who have the authority to do something about them.
Second, this in turn will allow the Company to eliminate these
Crisis sources, or-if the source cannot be eliminated-at least
bring them to the CMT's attention early enough so that the
Team may be able to mitigate the Crisis' most serious effects.99
And as an aside, not only are taking these steps the right thing
to do, but they could significantly reduce corporate penalties
under federal sentencing guidelines as well as potentially miti-
gate civil penalties or damages in regulatory investigations or
personal injury lawsuits.1"'
3. Third Task: Identify "Key Stakeholders"
The next initial task of the CMT will be to identify the Com-
pany's "key stakeholders." There are several broad reasons for
this exercise. For example, by identifying each stakeholder and
its particular needs and concerns early on, the CMT can craft a
CMP that is responsive to these needs and concerns from the
start. This in turn may allow the CMT to "proactively" influence
the Crisis as it unfolds, rather than merely reacting after-the-fact
to each new piece of bad news.101 Furthermore, it will be much
98 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 78-92.
- See id.
100 See, e.g., Gruner II, supra note 84, at 173-179, 169; Pitt & Groskaufmanis,
supra note 10, at 320.
101 See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 324-325.
Perhaps the most overused, and least understood, word of the
1980s was the term 'proactive.' But, in the context of crisis manage-
ment, proactive approaches are clearly the key to minimizing the
adverse consequences of any crisis . . . . Rather than waiting for
constituencies to define the issues, companies should take sensible
steps to anticipate what issues should be of interest to the constitu-
encies, and what responses will satisfy them that a crisis is being
managed carefully and with their interests in mind.
[66538
CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANNING
easier for the CMT to gather Post-Crisis stakeholder notification
information during the calm of the planning process than dur-
ing the hectic hours or days immediately following the disaster
that created the Crisis.
These key stakeholders may include: 112
(1) The Company's "direct" customers, i.e., for Air Carriers,
members of the general public, or the business people or
executives that those Operators routinely carry, and for
Companies that are not Air Carriers, the Air Carriers that
have installed the Devices manufactured or maintained
by those Companies.
(2) The Company's "indirect" customers, i.e., for non-Air
Carrier Companies the general public. As noted above,
although the general public in such situations does not
have a say as to whether the Aircraft they are flying on
contains Devices, their desires and concerns as to
whether to have them available is transmitted through
the Carriers and thus will have a direct impact on the Car-
riers' decisions to install and use them.
(3) Employees. It is critical to analyze the employees' impact
on the crisis management planning process. Without the
employees' full support and cooperation, the crisis man-
agement planning process and the implementation of the
CMP will be impossible.
(4) Subcontractors and contract employees. The need to
identify these entities is the same as with the Company's
own employees. Without the subcontractors' and con-
tract employees' support, any crisis management plan-
ning conducted by the Company is likely to fail.
(5) Appropriate federal officials. Should an Aircraft Acci-
dent or Incident occur involving an Aircraft, individuals
from the FAA, NTSB, and possibly federal district attor-
neys and criminal investigative personnel will likely
quickly become involved in related investigations.
(6) State and local officials for each area in which operations
are conducted. This may be a difficult task because, as
102 Once again, there seem to be as many thoughts on identifying "key stake-
holders" as there are disaster-preparation commentators. But the general con-
cept appears to be fairly uniform, and the specific stakeholders listed below
reflect the general commentary as applied to an aviation-industry setting. See,
e.g., COOMBS, supra note 1, at 44-58; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 324-
25.
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noted above, the Aircraft are operated literally every-
where by the Carriers. However, the Company can ana-
lyze, at a minimum, the areas or jurisdictions where it
conducts installation and maintenance of the Devices on
the Carrier's Aircraft.
(7) Senior management. As has been repeatedly stressed, it
is absolutely critical that senior management initiate and
support the crisis management planning process. In
many ways they may have the most to lose if an appropri-
ate process is not designed and implemented, and with-
out their full support the effort will surely fail.
(8) The board of directors or equivalent officers. As with the
senior management and the Company's other employees,
without the support of the board of directors, or the
equivalent officers, any crisis management planning ef-
forts are likely to fail.
Once all of the key stakeholders have been identified and
their points of view and possible concerns during the time of a
Crisis have been analyzed and considered as part of the plan-
ning process, this information, as appropriate, should be main-
tained and routinely updated in a Key-Stakeholder Directory
that will become part of the CMP checklists and appendices.
4. Fourth Task: Select Appropriate Subplans & Assign Appropriate
Planning Subgroups °3
Once the CMT has completed the first three tasks described
above, it should decide how it wants to continue with the overall
planning process. It may choose to continue with the Team
working on the process en masse.
But a more efficient way may be to identify pertinent "sub-
planning processes." Once these are identified, the Team could
then break down into appropriate subgroups that could individ-
ually work on their assigned tasks, with the different subteams
working on the different subtasks simultaneously.
Under this approach, the overall planning process could be
broken down into any number of subplanning processes. Three
such processes will be identified and discussed in greater detail
103 Once again, there seems to be an almost infinite number of ways to
conduct the nuts-and-bolts of crisis management planning. Thus, I did not rely
on any one source for this particular task. Rather, I considered all of the various
sources in light of the particular needs of members of the aviation community
generally, and the Company specifically, and devised this proposed step.
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below. The first will be a notification and implementation plan-
ning process, primarily for activating and implementing the
CMP and initiating communications with various key stakehold-
ers. The second will be a public affairs planning process, prima-
rily for dealing with the media and the general public. A third
will be a legal response and internal investigation planning pro-
cess, primarily for ensuring that appropriate legally-related steps
are taken to deal with the investigations and lawsuits that may
arise in the wake of a Crisis.
Once each major subplanning process and its end goals are
identified and the appropriate subgroups created and assigned,
the CMT would break into those subgroups with an appropriate
amount of time allowed for each to draft its applicable subplan.
At the end of that time, the CMT would reconvene to review the
product created by each subgroup. Once reviewed, the plans
would be approved and those portions of the plans that could
be implemented pre-Crisis would, in fact, be implemented. At
the end of this process, the Company would have in place the
first iteration of its Crisis Management Plan.
5. Fifth Task: Practice Scenarios, Periodic Revision & Post-Crisis
Critique
Finally, after all of the above steps have been taken and the
Company has completed its CMP, it should institute the ongo-
ing process of simulating or practicing, reviewing, and revising
the Plan." 4 For example, a practice scenario should be created
involving a potential crisis, such as an Aircraft Accident involv-
ing a Device manufactured by the Company. Support "play-
ers"-Company employees-can be drafted to play the parts of
various key stakeholders, such as Air Carrier representatives,
contract maintenance representatives; federal or local investiga-
tors or officials; and, finally, members of the press. A member
of the CMT can then be notified that such an "Aircraft Acci-
dent" has occurred, and the Notification and Implementation
Plan then invoked with the eventual full implementation of the
CMP. The scenario can be designed and time compressed over
a one or two day period so that every aspect of the Plan can be
tested under "real world" conditions. 10 5
104 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 109-119; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra
note 1, at 87.
105 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 109-119; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra
note 1, at 87.
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If the CMT ha' done a good job of drafting the CMP, the
process should be relatively self-sustaining once it has started.
But no matter how much time and effort the CMT has put into
the Plan, running the first practice scenario will likely expose
significant issues that had not been addressed in the initial plan-
ning process-which is exactly why it is so important to conduct
such a session. Thus, after the first practice session has been
run, the CMT can revise the CMP as appropriate. 10 6
The Company should then take at least two steps to ensure
the ongoing viability of the CMP. First, it should identify the
data in the CMP-such as the names, titles, and contact infor-
mation for CMT team members-that change over time, and
put into place a process periodically to update this information
in the CMP. Second, the CMP should schedule periodic (e.g.,
annual or semiannual) practice sessions as a means to review
and revise the CMP, and to familiarize new members of the
CMT with the overall process. 10 7 With such steps in place, the
Company will have created a "living document" that will give it
the tools to successfully deal with an Aviation Crisis, should one
ever arise.1 0
8
IV. THE SUBPLANNING PROCESS
As noted above, the CMT may wish to break down the overall
planning process into several subprocesses. This subpart pro-
vides more detailed guidance on three such subprocesses.
These include: (1) a notification and implementation planning
process, (2) a public affairs planning process, and (3) a legal
response and internal investigation planning process.
The CMT may discover as it conducts the initial master plan-
ning process that it does not need all of these plans, or that it
needs different or additional plans. Furthermore, there may be
overlap between the subplans. The CMT should therefore keep
the planning process flexible so that as the subplans develop,
additional plans can be identified and various tasks can be as-
signed or reassigned to different subgroups or individuals in or-
der to create the most efficient planning and implementation
process.
106 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 109-119; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra
note 1, at 87.
107 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 109-119; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra
note 1, at 87.
10s See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 109-119; OGRIZEK & GUILLERY, supra
note 1, at 87.
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A. NOTIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING
1. General Purpose and Appropriate Subgroup1 09
a. General Purposes
Notification and implementation planning serves several
functions, including building processes to:
" Notify and gather the entire CMT in light of a potential
Crisis;
* Conduct an initial assessment of the situation to determine
whether it, in fact, constitutes a Crisis;
" Make the determination of whether the CMT needs to be
augmented in light of the actual Crisis that has occurred;
* Establish contact with various key stakeholders' points of
contact, as appropriate;
* Implement other subplans as appropriate; and
* Monitor and modify as necessary the overall CMP imple-
mentation process through the resolution of the Crisis.
b. Appropriate Subgroup
In light of these various functions, personnel conducting the
notification and subplanning function should include at a mini-
mum representatives from senior management, the general
counsel's office, operations, public affairs, and whomever else
the CMT deems appropriate.
2. Pre-Crisis Planning and Implementation
a. Gather Required Information
In order to meet the general goals described above, the first
task under the notification subplanning process will be the col-
lection of the information necessary to implement the plan. For
example, the subgroup will need to gather information such as:
Operational or Product information. The subgroup should com-
pile a table that lists all of the Air-Carrier Company's Aircraft, or
for non-Air-Carrier Companies, the Devices and the Air Carriers
that use these Devices. If possible, the table should tie specific
Devices to specific Air Carrier Aircraft, so that if, for example, a
CMT member hears of an aircraft accident in the news, the
09 Much of this discussion is simply an expansion of the concepts already
introduced above, offered with the Company's specific aviation-related business
operations in mind.
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CMT could quickly determine if the crash involves an Aircraft
carrying a Device.
Operational locations and subcontractor information. Along the
same lines as the operational and product information, the sub-
group should compile a table that lists the various locations
where Aircraft are Operated or where installation and mainte-
nance of the Devices occurs, and subcontractor information on
who is doing this installation or maintenance. Thus, if an inci-
dent occurs at one of these locations the CMT will be able to
determine quickly whether it could possibly involve the Com-
pany, and who to attempt to contact at that location.
CMT member contact information. The subgroup should also
compile a table that lists contact information for each member
of the CMT so that if and when an incident occurs, the entire
Team can be quickly mobilized to assess the situation.
Key stakeholder contact information. As discussed above, identifi-
cation of the key stakeholders is one of the preliminary steps
necessary to create the overall CMP. Using the overall key stake-
holder information collected, the subgroup should then deter-
mine which key stakeholders the Company will likely wish to
contact in light of a Crisis-namely representatives at or with
the Air Carriers; Subcontractors; senior management and direc-
tors/officers: and possibly federal, state, and local officials.110 Fi-
nally, once all of this information is gathered, it should be
maintained and routinely updated in appropriate tables and ap-
pendices to the CMP. 111
b. Establish Relationships with Key Stakeholders
Once certain key stakeholders and their points of contact are
identified, the Company should consider taking steps to estab-
lish ongoing relationships with the stakeholders as appropriate.
For example, for non-Air-Carrier Companies, such Companies
should consider establishing a relationship with their Air Carri-
ers for several reasons. Namely, it will allow for pre-coordina-
tion of disaster response plans, give substantial notice to those
Air Carriers that the Company is concerned and "proactive"
about safety and crisis management issues, tend to mitigate the
possibility that the Company may quickly become a "scapegoat"
110 See Part II, Subpart II: Table Templates, for examples of these tables.
Ill See, for example, CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 110-112, for a process outline




in the aftermath of a Crisis, and potentially allow the Company
access to the post-Accident investigation process that it might
not otherwise obtain.1 12
Likewise, for either type of Company, establishing an ongoing
relationship with local FAA officials that emphasizes the Com-
pany's interest in safety and crisis management may also go a
long way to gaining for the Company an initial "benefit of the
doubt" in the immediate aftermath of a Crisis. Furthermore,
FAA regulatory enforcement materials are replete with an em-
phasis on the importance the FAA places on an aviation busi-
ness's compliance and safety-minded attitude. Establishing this
attitude up front could arguably put the Company in a much
better position should it become the target of a regulatory
investigation.' 1 3
c. Create a "Notification Tree"
After gathering the necessary information, the next step in
this planning subprocess should be the creation of a notification
tree for the rapid notification of all CMT members, should any
one member receive notice that an event has occurred that may
constitute a Crisis. The notification tree should include or take
the form of a "self-executing" checklist that will ensure that each
member of the CMT is quickly notified and joined together, ei-
ther in person or through conference call, etc., so that the CMT
can begin the CMP response process. The notification tree
needs to include contact information for each CMT member,
with sufficient and constantly updated information to allow the
immediate contact of each member 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year.' 1 4
d. Create a Notification Implementation Checklist
Once the CMT has been notified and gathered, it will need a
checklist it can follow to ensure that it will adequately evaluate
and address the overall situation. In other words, the checklist
should guide the CMT through the process of (1) initially evalu-
ating the situation; (2) augmenting the CMT as necessary; (3)
implementing the other subplans as appropriate; (4) contacting
key stakeholders as appropriate; and so forth." 5
112 See discussion supra Part 11(B) (2) (b); see also COOMBS, supra note 1, at 44-58.
113 See id.
114 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 107-08.
115 See id.
2001] 545
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
e. Implement Portions of the Plan as Appropriate
Once the CMT has conducted all of the Pre-Crisis planning
that it can through this subgroup, those portions of the plan
that can be implemented should be. For example, sufficient
copies of the notification tree, contact directories, and so forth
should be made and distributed to the proper individuals-
keeping in mind the privilege concerns discussed above-to en-
sure that the Post-Crisis plans can be quickly implemented, that
relationships with the targeted key stakeholders are established,
and so forth.1 16
3. Post-Crisis Planning and Implementation
Once all the steps above have been addressed, and the CMT
learns of a potential Crisis, the notification tree checklist should
be implemented. It will then convene to determine whether the
event that has been reported actually constitutes a Crisis. If not,
the CMT should monitor the situation to ensure that it does not
develop into a Crisis. If the event constitutes a Crisis, the team
should continue with running the remainder of the appropriate
checklists as required.' 1 7
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLANNING
1. General Purpose and Appropriate Subgroup1 18
a. General Purposes
The public affairs planning process may be the most critical
activity to the Post-Crisis survival of any Company, for the overall
goal of the subplan is to maintain good public relations-and
thus the Company's good will-in the aftermath of an event that
calls the safety of that Company's Operations or Devices into
question." 9 A secondary or supporting goal of the subplan for
116 See id.
117 See id. at 230-33.
118 This is arguably the area of crisis management planning that has historically
drawn the most attention by the commentators, so numerous excellent texts exist
to help with the process. Once again, I have drawn on many of them, going
beyond what I have cited to in this article. But where I adopted a specific
sentiment from one of these commentators, I have included a cite to that
material.
119 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 142-43; see also Newman, supra note 8,
at 1. Note that, at first blush, this section may not appear to apply to Aircraft
Operators that are not Air Carriers, such as in-house flight department Operators
that do not fly passengers in common carriage. But the general provisions dis-
cussed here may well apply if an accident involving such Operators calls into
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non-Air-Carrier Companies-Companies responding to crises in
which the first-line regulatory and investigative response will be-
long to the Air Carriers rather than those Companies them-
selves-is to establish another reason to create a relationship
with those Air Carriers that will facilitate such Company's partic-
ipation in the investigative process where necessary in order to
protect the Company's interests.
b. Appropriate Subgroup
This planning subgroup should therefore be composed, at a
minimum, of senior public relations personnel, senior manage-
ment personnel, Counsel and operations personnel, and whom-
ever else the CMT deems appropriate.
2. Pre-Crisis Planning
Pre-Crisis planning by this subgroup will generally involve two
processes: (1) An analysis of potential situations in which the
Company may want to conduct or participate in press confer-
ences or issue press releases, and (2) overall guidelines on pub-
lic statements made by the Company in the aftermath of a Crisis.
a. Analyze Possible Actions, Including Participation with Air
Carriers
One significant task that the subgroup will face is analyzing
whether and when the Company may want to issue public state-
ments or hold press conferences after a Crisis occurs. This task
really includes deciding on the answers to several questions,
such as: should the Company speak at all? If it does, how much
should it say (i.e., should it release everything it knows)? And
for non-Air-Carrier Companies, should it act on its own or in
concert with the involved Air Carrier?
Generally speaking, the answers to the first two questions are:
although in some instances it may be appropriate to remain si-
lent (most notably, when there is no verifiable information avail-
able), it is usually better to say something. On the other hand,
while it is usually better to say something than nothing at all, this
does not necessarily mean the Company should release all it
knows; releasing everything could well be worse than remaining
silent.12 0
question, for example, the parent company's dedication to protecting its own
employees and executives.
120 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 144; Newman, supra note 8, at 2.
2001] 547
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The ultimate answers to these first two questions will depend
on many issues. These may include answers to questions such
as: (1) What are the possible Crisis scenarios? (2) What are the
possible reactions of the Company's key stakeholders to those
Crisis scenarios? (3) What are the various positive or negative
ramifications of communicating to the key stakeholders in light
of these scenarios? All of these issues should already have been
raised, if not addressed, in the master planning process de-
scribed above. 121
Furthermore, the answers to the questions of whether to
speak and how much to say will also rest to some extent on more
generic considerations, such as general corporate communica-
tions practices and legal liability concerns, which are discussed
in more depth below. 122
The answer to the third question-whether a non-Air Carrier
Company should act in concert with the Air Carrier-will proba-
bly be the most situational of all. Questions the subgroup may
want to consider as part of this analysis could include: (1) What
is the likelihood that the particular Air Carrier may attempt to
blame the Company for the Aircraft Accident? (2) What is the
likelihood that the public may identify the Air Carrier with the
Company, or vice versa? (3) What would be the short- and long-
term ramifications of such perceptions by the Company's key
stakeholders?
Once again, some if not all of this information should have
already been gathered, if not analyzed, in the master planning
process described above. This being said, it will be difficult, if
not impossible, to decide whether the Company should seek to
participate with the Air Carriers until a particular Crisis, attend-
ant with all of its unique facts, actually arises. However, in light
of the fact that it may be advantageous in some situations to seek
to participate with the Carriers, the subgroup may wish to estab-
lish a relationship with, at least, the public affairs personnel for
each Carrier. Then, if the Company feels in the wake of a Crisis
that close cooperation is warranted, points of contact and famili-
arity with the particular Carrier will already be established,
hopefully facilitating Post-Crisis cooperation.
121 See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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b. Create Guidelines for Dealing with the Public
The subgroup's second task should be to create a checklist or
set of guidelines that the Company can follow Post-Crisis,
whether the Company is cooperating with a particular Carrier,
issuing statements, or holding press conferences on its own.
These guidelines should be based both on the specific key stake-
holder information addressed above, and on various general
corporate communications and legal-liability concerns, such as:
Why talk? The first question that typically arises in a crisis is:
"Why talk?" The most innocuous comment can assume a life of
its own once litigation begins in the aftermath of a crisis. Thus,
the automatic response of most litigation counsel is to think that
all that matters is protecting the "bad" facts from disclosure. 123
This tendency to withhold information in the aftermath of a
crisis overlooks the crucial fact that the preservation of a Com-
pany's credibility in the marketplace and at the courthouse will
likely turn on whether the Company is seen to be telling the
truth and acting responsibly. Doing that may mean compromis-
ing on some of the traditional litigation "absolutes." Winning
the case while losing the Company does not constitute success-
ful crisis resolution. 124
Furthermore, stonewalling techniques generally do not im-
press the public.125 For example, the Watergate break-in did not
lead to Richard Nixon's resignation from the presidency; rather,
the ensuing cover-up did. The refusal to comment may well be
perceived as evasive and irresponsible, if not utterly uncaring.
The tendency to make "no comment" sounds like "taking the
Fifth." In the court of public opinion, taking the Fifth Amend-
ment is tantamount to an admission of guilt.126
A Company will not be able to avoid the issues forever. And if
the press senses that the Company has assumed a "bunker
mentality," their interest and attention will only increase. The
unavoidable fact is that the media is going to tell a story, and it
will probably be much better for the Company if it has some
123 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 8, at 1.
124 See id.; see also PINSDORF, supra note 1, at 38-41.
125 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 141, 209-210.
126 See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 1, at v; CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 209-210;
PINSDORF, supra note 1, at 56.
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hand in writing that story. 127 Thus, the question becomes what
to say and when to say it.
When to talk and what to say? First, a Company should keep in
mind that although early disclosure tends to show it is forthright
and trustworthy, and that most public relations professionals
agree that a proactive policy with the public provides more long-
term benefits than pitfalls, the Company must tread very care-
fully if it does not have complete information. For example, if a
Company is seen to misrepresent or withhold damaging infor-
mation early on, its later statements will be less credible. Thus,
the short answer to the question of when to talk and what to say
is that the Company should begin to talk as soon as it has some-
thing constructive, concrete, and verifiable to say. 128
Who Will Be the Spokesperson? Generally speaking, there should
be two pre-conditions to the Company's choice of its spokesper-
son: (1) He or she should be as highly placed in the organiza-
tion as possible, and (2) he or she should be able to act as
spokesperson for the duration of the Crisis. Then, other signifi-
cant factors to consider are the potential spokesperson's per-
ceived credibility: the ability to quickly learn information and
then express that knowledge effectively; the ability to listen care-
fully; the ability to express compassion and warmth; a willing-
ness to accept critique; the ability to remain calm under
pressure; and the stamina to work long, pressure-filled hours.
Finding a person who fills all of these characteristics may ac-
complish a number of things. For example, it can convey to the
general public, and to the various regulatory and investigative
agencies listening along with the general public, the seriousness
with which a Company is taking the crisis. It hopefully will also
allow a relationship of trust to develop between the Company
and that audience. By doing these things, that Company may
help to mitigate either the chances that personal injury lawsuits
are filed or the pressure on the various agencies to investigate
the Company with zeal.'19
"Do's and Don'ts." In light of all of these and many other fac-
tors and issues not necessarily identified above, here is a practi-
cal list of "do's and don'ts" for public announcements by a
127 See, e.g., PINSDORF, supra note 1, at 15-36 (discussing the need for corpora-
dons to interact appropriate with the media during a crisis).
128 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, chs. 9 & 10 (providing detailed treatment
on dealing with the media and other key stakeholders during a crisis).
129 See id. at 201-07.
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Company during a crisis, realizing that everq crisis is unique,
public relations advisors should be consulted, and an alternate
approach may be optimal."' 0
"D O' s "
Do stay "on message." Identify the Company's legal and busi-
ness goals. Formulate the message or theme and stick to it.
Do tell the truth. Never lie. If the CMT does not have all of
the facts and it is necessary to speak to the media (which it al-
most always is), find respectful ways of not commenting until a
later point in time. For example: "Here's what we know; here's
what we can tell you; here's what we're doing to investigate it;
and here's how we're limiting the harm and correcting the situa-
tion. We will let you know when we know more."
Do watch your demeanor. Choose the attitude that best suits
the Company's message and do not get distracted. Word choice
and demeanor are key. How a person says something is as im-
portant, or perhaps more important, than the substantive con-
tent. Proper language and tone can convey the impression that
events are under control and that the Company is doing every-
thing it can to respond effectively to the crisis. People will prob-
ably remember the impression the spokesperson makes much
longer than what he or she actually says.
Do pick a proper backdrop. The street in front of the crisis
location with emergency vehicles streaming by and dazed work-
ers stumbling around is probably not the visual image a Com-
pany wishes to project. If at all possible, pick a backdrop that
helps the spokesperson tell the Company's story, or at least one
that is neutral and not distracting.
Do be accessible. If the media cannot reach someone from
the Company for comment, they will likely say that Company
representatives would not return telephone calls, which may
sound like the Company is guilty or giving them the dodge.
Do be prepared with current information. Do not let the me-
dia surprise the spokesperson with new, 'just in" information.
Break the news to the press before they break it to you. The
longer a Company waits to make its announcement, the more
time the rumor mill has to grind.
Do prepare a written statement. Front-end load the Com-
pany's key points, and try to write in sound bites of twenty words
130 These practice tips are collected from all of the sources cited supra notes
118-29.
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or less. Put the bad news up front in the announcement, even if
it feels like the message is too abrupt or the Company fears it
will be misunderstood because it has not given the big picture.
Otherwise, people simply will not pay attention until the an-
nouncement "lets the other shoe drop." The announcement
should state the bad news in plain English, and then, when it
has the readers' attention, put that news in its proper context.
Do anticipate likely questions with other members of the
CMT, and go over the spokesperson's remarks quickly before
meeting with the press.
Do have information monitored by counsel for legal implica-
tions. Make sure that comments made in public are consistent
with the in-house documents and are consistent with the litiga-
tion goals. It goes without saying that statements to the public
need to be checked for their impact on the various privileges as
well.
Do pay attention to the needs and concerns of the Company's
employees. If the incident has caused the serious injury or
death of Company employees, then have a senior representative
of the Company meet with the injured or remaining family
members before they are discussed in the news or publicly by
the spokesperson. Make sure that all of the employees are kept
well informed and know that the Company is concerned about
their welfare, both as to their personal safety and as to the con-
tinuing viability of their jobs.
Do pay attention to the needs and concerns of members of the
general public who may have been injured or killed. Without
admitting liability, make sure that the injureds' or survivors' im-
mediate needs are being met. Not only is this the right thing to
do, but a little bit of goodwill by the Company early in the crisis
may forestall a great deal of ill-will later on.
"DON'Ts ":
Don't speculate about the cause, consequences, or liability.
Don't estimate costs of damage, cleanup, containment, penal-
ties, and so forth.
Don't answer hypothetical questions. For example: "Isn't it
true, Mr. Companyman, that if the widget had been properly
installed then the thingamabob wouldn't have ignited the fire?"
Answer: "At this point, we are still in the process of investigating
things. We'll get back to you when we have more information."
If the press follows up, insisting that the spokesperson answer
the "what if' question, he or she should note that the Company
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currently does not know that to be true, so it really is too early to
draw any conclusions.
Don't talk off the record. Assume anything anyone identified
with the Company says will be printed or broadcast. Pay atten-
tion to the fact that parabolic microphones can pick up any
witty, gallows humor jokes made among colleagues from quite a
distance. As several politicians are painfully aware, it is too late
after the speaker has said it to ask "is this thing on?"
Don't try to be funny. The last thing a Company and its
spokesperson needs is to be painted as insensitive or as not tak-
ing the situation seriously.
Don't try to spread the blame. Complaints about any em-
ployee, equipment, or contractor, or statements about the effec-
tiveness of any government response, are almost sure to
backfire. The old adage that when you point at someone else
you have four fingers pointing back at you applies.
Don't minimize. The message a Company wants to convey is
that it understands the gravity of the situation and is doing eve-
rything it can to take care of it. "We are concerned, and we are
taking the steps to contain damage and fix the problem."
Don't "spin." Stick to what is unquestionably true, and do not
try to sugarcoat it. For example, when there has been a loss of
life or significant injury, the only comment that is appropriate in
the immediate aftermath is, "Our thoughts and prayers are with
the families tonight, and we are committed to finding out what
went wrong." Now is not the time to talk about your immaculate
safety record.
Don't take the blame. Do not admit fault. Take responsibility
for the situation and seek to address it. This is a Company's
chance to get, as far as possible, on the side of the angels. The
attitude it wants to project is that it is not the Company's fault,
but that it sees it as its problem, and it is committed to finding
and implementing the solution.
When dealing with subsequent litigation, taking responsibil-
ity, but not taking the blame, helps a Company because by the
time the case gets to court on the liability issue, it has the argu-
ment that it did its best to end the crisis, it did its best to miti-
gate damages, and it has already given restitution. Rightly or
wrongly, fairly or unfairly, jury research, interviews with jurors
after trial, and public opinion polls demonstrate that the public,
and juries believe that corporations bear special and heightened
responsibilities for public welfare. Companies who do not make
efforts to live up to these heightened expectations do so at their
5532001]
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peril, particularly in the context of litigation of punitive dam-
ages claims arising from a corporate crisis.
Don't talk the Company out of its privileges. As discussed
above, some courts have held that a public statement by a corpo-
rate official can demonstrate that an internal investigation con-
ducted by counsel was conducted for "business" purposes and,
therefore, is not entitled to work product protection.
Although the restoration of public confidence is obviously
very important to any Company, the Company needs to mini-
mize the risk that a court will subsequently strike down privi-
leges or protections of materials generated in the investigation
of the crisis. In accordance with the detailed discussion above
on the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine,
if the spokesperson talks about the investigation to the public at
all, he or she should make it plain that the primary reason for
the investigation is to render legal advice to the Company.
Don't talk the Company out of insurance coverage. Communi-
cations with the government or media can be used against a
Company as a basis for denial of insurance coverage. Since most
policies exclude coverage for acts expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured, care should be taken to avoid
statements that could reflect on this issue.
3. Post-Crisis Implementation
Quite simply, the Post-Crisis implementation of the public af-
fairs plan is to, as quickly as possible, assess the particular facts of
the catastrophe and then apply the principles that have been
discussed above. Once this is done, the Company should be
prepared either to convene a press conference or to make ap-
propriate press releases. The CMT should then continue to
monitor the status of the Crisis and hold timely press confer-
ences or issue press releases as required.
C. LEGAL RESPONSE & INTERNAL INVESTIGATION PLANNING
1. General Purpose and Appropriate Subgroup
a. General Purpose
The general purpose of the legal response and internal inves-
tigation planning process is to prepare the Company for the le-




" Conduct pre-Crisis planning by reviewing and preparing for
various legal issues that could have a significant impact on
the Company's potential Post-Crisis liabilities.
* Design and distribute various applicable guidelines to all
employees.
* Establish checklists for Counsel's immediate Post-Crisis re-
sponse and the subsequent implementation of an internal
investigation.
b. Appropriate Subgroup
This subgroup should include, at a minimum, appropriate
members from the Counsel's office, senior management, opera-
tions, risk management, and whomever else the CMT deems ap-




It is appropriate to address this subplanning process last. By
first attacking all of the various issues that have been discussed
above, Counsel and this subgroup will have already completed a
substantial portion of this subplanning process. For example:
" By coordinating with senior management to implement and
conduct crisis management planning, Counsel will have as-
sisted in taking the first critical step in mitigating, if not
eliminating, potential legal crises facing the Company.13 1
• By conducting a privilege review, as described above, and
coordinating the overall crisis management planning pro-
cess accordingly, Counsel will have taken steps to ensure
that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine will apply to this effort as much as is possible and
appropriate. 132
" By conducting a review of the various aviation-related duties
and potential liabilities as outlined above, and by participat-
ing in the process of identifying the key stakeholders that
minister to those duties and potential liabilities, Counsel
will have laid the groundwork for properly responding to
those duties and liabilities if and when they arise.1 33
131 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 25-63.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 64-87, 101-02.
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" By participating in the second step of the master planning
process-identifying and eliminating potential crisis
sources-counsel will have taken substantial steps toward
implementing a legal compliance program.13 4
" By assisting in the notification and implementation sub-
process, Counsel will have been able to put into place pro-
cedures for collecting important evidence as to when the
Company first became aware of the disaster that underlies
the Crisis. 3 '
" By assisting in the public affairs planning subprocess, Coun-
sel will have been able to put into place balanced and ap-
propriate procedures for communicating with the public,
while not placing the Company in the unfavorable position
of inappropriately acknowledging liability or destroying in-
surance coverage. 1
36
b. Additional Task: Employee Communications
In addition to the tasks discussed above, Counsel and this sub-
group should also conduct planning that goes beyond these
steps. Specifically, there are at least three other areas they may
consider addressing. The first area deals with communicating
with one of the Company's most important key stakeholders-
its employees.
The Company's employees will be key to both uncovering po-
tential disaster sources and dealing with the effects of the Crisis
once it has occurred; those employees could easily become ei-
ther the Company's best allies or one of its biggest problems. 137
It is therefore imperative that the subgroup establish clear com-
munication channels and guidelines with and for its employees
before a Crisis occurs. There should be two specific goals in
doing this.
The first goal is to control the potential release of damaging
statements to regulators, law enforcement, and the media in the
aftermath of an Aircraft Incident or Accident that could turn
into a Crisis. For example, the subgroup should draft guidelines
for employees along the lines that should any incident occur
that could lead to a Crisis for the Company, employees are to
134 See supra text accompanying notes 92-100; see also Gruner, supra note 25,
passim (discussing the importance of implementing legal compliance programs).
1s5 See supra text accompanying notes 109-17.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 118-30.
137 See, e.g., CAPONIGRO, supra note 1, at 158-61.
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(1) decline answering any questions from anyone concerning
the incident, (2) refer all questions to the Counsel's office, (3)
inform Counsel that they have been questioned by someone
outside of the Company, and (4) not discuss in casual conversa-
tion any aspects of the incident until follow-on guidelines have
been issued by the Counsel's office.
The second goal is to establish a positive rapport with the em-
ployees. Doing so will help (1) garner their support for the
Company's position both before and after the Crisis, (2) avoid
spreading damaging rumors about the Crisis, (3) establish their
belief that the Company's senior management and the CMT are
managing the Crisis as effectively as possible, (4) reinforce the
Company's core messages to all of the key stakeholders during
the Crisis, (5) maintain their focus on their day-to-day responsi-
bilities during the Crisis, and (6) maintain a positive attitude
with customers, suppliers, other employees, and so forth."3 8
The subgroup should keep a number of principles in mind
while drafting these guidelines. For example, the Company
should:
" Work hard to establish a positive rapport with its employees
before a Crisis occurs;
" Communicate openly and honestly with employees during a
Crisis;
" Specifically ask for assistance from its employees, not simply
expect it;
" Choose the best vehicle to deliver the message (if the mes-
sage is simply "informational," then a simple memo may be
appropriate, but if the message will have a major impact on
the employees' lives-e.g., the Crisis will cause layoffs,
etc.-then a more personal vehicle such as a live or video-
taped message from a senior officer may be more
appropriate);
" Communicate with and to the employees as quickly as possi-
ble after the Crisis has occurred;
" Clearly state the Company's core messages and then period-
ically reinforce them;
" Maintain a regular level of communication;
• Tell them as much as is appropriate to communicate, keep-
ing in mind privilege issues;
- Id. at 163-64.
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* If the Company cannot disseminate some piece of informa-
tion that the employees would like to hear because of confi-
dentiality or privilege concerns, then let the employees
know why it cannot be discussed at that particular time;
* Convey basic factors leading to the Company's key
decisions;
* Convey difficult decisions such as employee layoffs in a fair
and compassionate manner;
* Provide multiple opportunities for employees to ask ques-
tions, provide feedback, make suggestions, and express
concerns;
* Treat employees the way Counsel and senior management
would want to be treated;
* Disseminate information such that all of the employees re-
ceive the information at roughly the same time;
* Consider using a different spokesperson than the media
spokesperson, if appropriate under the specific facts of the
Crisis;
* Let the employees know that the Company will update
them on a regular basis, and then follow through; and
* Give them a specific "call to action" they can focus on, e.g.,
helping to spread the Company's core message about the
Crisis, remaining focused on their jobs, maintaining confi-
dence in the Company, and refraining from spreading
rumors.13
9
Finally, the subgroup, and specifically Counsel, must craft and
review all of these principles and the resulting guidelines with
the issues of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
in mind.
c. Additional Task: Document Retention
In addition to drafting guidelines for Pre- and Post-Crisis em-
ployee communications, the subgroup should also devise an ap-
propriate document retention policy, if one does not already
exist. 40 For aviation industry companies such as the Company,
factors that would impact this policy will come from sources
such as the three typical areas of legal liabilities addressed
above, 14" ' plus whatever other non-aviation regulatory burdens
the Company may face (e.g., potential document retention poli-
139 Id. at 160-67.
140 See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 325-26.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 64-87.
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cies dictated by the other state or federal agencies that may have
jurisdiction over the Company).
The subgroup and Counsel should keep a number of princi-
ples in mind while drafting these policies. First, the policies
should emphasize to senior management, and to all employees,
that the documents they create could well end up in a zealous
regulator's hands or on the first page of the local newspaper;
they should therefore be very careful both with what they write
and with what they keep in their files. Second, if they create
documents that are intended for Counsel, then they should be
clearly marked as privileged and kept confidential, as discussed
at length above. Third, the subgroup should ensure that spe-
cific guidelines are put into place for maintaining, and eventu-
ally destroying, regulatory required documents. 142 Finally, the
guidelines should make clear that as soon as an incident occurs
that could trigger a Crisis for the Company, all destruction of
documents must cease, lest an agency or court later determine
that the Company was attempting to destroy relevant
evidence. 143
d. Additional Task: Internal Investigation Plan
Finally, the last set of guidelines the subgroup and Counsel
may consider creating deal with the Company's own internal in-
vestigation of the Aircraft Accident or Incident that gave rise to
the pending Crisis. The goals of these guidelines should be two-
fold. First, the guidelines should ensure that the Company takes
all required legal steps immediately after the Crisis arises. For
example, the subgroup should determine whether any insur-
ance notification is required, or if any regulatory notification
may be necessary.
Second, the guidelines should assist Counsel in quickly deter-
mining exactly what happened, and in preserving "fresh" evi-
142 For example, Appendix B to Part 43 of the FAR's generally requires that
any business making major repairs or alterations to aircraft pursuant to authority
granted under Part 43 must maintain the applicable records for those repairs for
a minimum of two years. This being said, because the burden of establishing a
regulatory violation against such a business rests with the FAA, the value of keep-
ing records that could assist the FAA in meeting this burden longer than is re-
quired by the regulations should be assessed. The Company should therefore
review all of the FARs applicable to the different types of work it is doing on the
Aircraft, with a specific eye to other document-retention requirements under
those FARs, and craft its document retention and destruction guidelines
accordingly.
143 See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 10, at 326.
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dence along the way. As has been discussed at length above, a
Crisis will likely trigger regulatory, civil, or criminal proceedings,
if not all three. Counsel will be in a much better position to
deal with these potential legal actions if it has a good grasp on
the underlying facts before they begin. Furthermore, by starting
the investigation process as quickly as possible, Counsel in-
creases the opportunity to find and preserve as complete a re-
cord as possible before the evidence begins to slip away. 44
Therefore, the subgroup and Counsel should draft guidelines
that call for (1) conducting interviews with employees who may
have personal knowledge of facts underlying the incident that
gave rise to the Crisis, and (2) collecting documents, records or
other tangible evidence that may be germane to later external
investigations. At least three major warnings come to mind re-
garding these efforts, however.
First, Counsel must keep in mind that if an attorney repre-
senting the Company is speaking to an employee who the Com-
pany later determines was acting outside the scope of his or her
employment, for example, then the ethical rules that apply in
that particular jurisdiction may require the attorney to give fair
notice to the employee that an attorney-client relationship with
that individual employee may not exist. In such a situation, in-
formation divulged by the employee could thus potentially be
used by the Company or by regulators against that employee at a
later date.'45
Second, in gathering evidence in the immediate aftermath of
the Crisis, the Company must take great care to not interfere
with any investigations being conducted by the NTSB or the ap-
plicable local criminal authority or to take any steps that could
be misconstrued as interfering with or misleading those
investigators.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized enough that all of these
steps must be taken with privilege issues kept firmly in mind in
order to avoid inadvertently waiving the protection of state-
ments and documents that the privileges afford.146
V. CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction above, the overall goal in
presenting these materials is to provide a guide to an effective
144 See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 25 at 1173-75.
145 See id. at 1181-85.
146 See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 25, at 1177-81.
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and efficient crisis management planning process. Hopefully
this manual will assist the Company in conducting a meaningful
CMP planning process and will allow the Company to reap all
the benefits of having its CMP firmly in place.
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APPENDIX I:
DRAFT CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN
CHECKLISTS AND TEMPLATES
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MASTER PLANNING PROCESS CHECKLIST
F] Senior Management commits to and initiates crisis management
planning.
[] General counsel's office makes initial review of planning materials for
purposes of assessing potential implementation or attachment of
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
0 Review appropriate privilege materials.
El Review appropriate potential liability materials.
D] Draft guidelines for what material the Company will seek to
protect.
l Draft guidelines for creation and use of designated material,
including instructions on labeling and limited dissemination.
LI Senior management and general counsel create crisis management team
("CMT").
LI CMT identifies and seeks to eliminate sources of potential crises.
F] Conduct internal safety audit of operations.
LI Create corporate code of conduct.
LI Create or designate corporate safety concern response officer.
LI Create safety concern/occurrence reporting guidelines.
LI Eliminate potential crisis sources where possible.
LI CMT identifies key stakeholders.
LI Create contact sheets for each subgroup of stakeholders as
appropriate.




[] Identify unique issues or concerns for each group of key
stakeholders.
D] CMT identifies which subplans should be created.
LII CMT designates appropriate subgroups to draft each applicable
subplan.
D] Subgroups draft subplans.
Eli CMT reconvenes to review and approve subplans created by the
subgroups: CMP created.
[] CMT conducts practice scenarios revising CMP as required.
[] CMT conducts post-crisis review and revisions as appropriate.
END.
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PRE-CRISIS NOTIFICATION &
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN CHECKLIST
[] Gather required information on all CMT members.
D] Create notification tree for CMT.
FD Create products table detailing devices carried by air carriers.
E] Create contact tables for key stakeholders.
r_ Establish CMT response relationships with air carriers and other key
stakeholders as appropriate.
F] Create implementation plan for contact with key stakeholders in the
event of a crisis.
END.






] Activate notification tree - notify entire CMT.
D] CMT conducts initial assessment of situation.
D] CMT makes determination as to whether situation constitutes a crisis.
D If no, CMT continues to monitor situation as appropriate.
D If yes, CMT continues this checklist.
D] CMT augments itself as necessary.
[] CMT implements each subplan as appropriate.
[] CMT contacts key stakeholders, such as air carrier points of contact, as
appropriate.
END.
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PRE-CRISIS PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PLAN CHECKLIST
D] Subgroup creates general strategies and guidelines for various possible
crisis scenarios.
LI Create contact and pre-coordination plan with appropriate key
stakeholder points of contact, such as air carrier, media relations, or
senior management personnel.
F- Create and pre-coordinate appropriate relationships with subcontractor
point of contact.
F- Draft and disseminate, in conjunction with general counsel, guidelines
for employees with respect to giving statements to the public or press.
END.






LI CMT assesses initial situation or crisis.
[] CMT designates spokesperson (if not already designated).
lii CMT coordinates with air carrier and subcontractor points of contact
regarding the air carrier's or subcontractor's public affairs plans
(where applicable).
LI Spokesperson makes press statements, if appropriate.
LI Spokesperson conducts follow-up or continuing conferences as
appropriate.
END.
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PRE-CRISIS LEGAL RESPONSE &
INTERNAL INVESTIGATION CHECKLIST
FD Conduct ongoing assessment with respect to privilege issues.
ED Lay groundwork for later potential legal activity.
] Review regulatory environment.
FD Review torts or civil action environment.
[] Review criminal indictment environment.
FD Create template for internal investigation plan.
D] Coordinate with risk management personnel to ensure that appropriate
insurance is in place in light of operations audit.
[] Draft and disseminate preliminary guidelines for employee activity.
FD Document retention policies.
F- Statements to press or regulators in general.
FI Coordinate with air carrier or device manufacturer or maintainer legal
counsel regarding potential responses to legal investigations.
END.
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POST-CRISIS LEGAL RESPONSE & INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION CHECKLIST
[] Reassess privilege issues.
FD Update and disseminate guidelines to employees regarding specific
investigations as appropriate.
F Direct that all document destruction ceases.
[] Issue guidelines with respect to interviews by regulators or press.
[] Commence internal investigation plan.
LI Contact insurance carriers to provide notice of loss or potential loss as
appropriate.
LI Contact air carrier or device manufacturer or maintainer points of
contact as appropriate and ensure that Company becomes part of the
NTSB/FAA investigatory process as appropriate.
END.
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JANE DOE Work: (111) 555-6789 1234 Any Street
CEO Mobile: (111) 123-4567 Anytown, USA 012345
9999 Company Rd. Home: (111) 555-1234
Businesstown, USA 11111 Pager: (111)456-7890
Asst: Anna Smith E-mail: janedoepCompany.com
JOHN DOE Work:
General Counsel Mobile:
9999 Company Rd. Home:
Businesstown, USA 11111 Pager:






o a y CMIP Planning Manual Page 12
574
Company CMP Planning Manual







ABC Airlines Jane Doe 9999 Company Rd. * Device safety
Businesstown, USA 11111 * Aviation Disaster
Work: (11) 555-6789 induced liabilities
Fax: (111)555-1234 * Etc.
ianedoe(aCompany.com
Asst: Joe Smith
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AIRCRAFT OR DEVICE INFORMATION
(CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM)
ABC Air Taxi N1234 Lear 45
N9876 Gulfstream III
N5678 Hawker 800
DEF Aircraft Repairs N1000 Lear 60
N2000 Cessna Citation Ill
GHI Air Device Manufacturing N8000 Device model A
N9000 Device model B
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EMERGENCY NEWS RELEASE FORM
(CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM)





























APPENDIX I(C): CRISIS MANAGEMENT
PLAN TEMPLATE1
These templates were culled from a number of sources. See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 1, at198; COOMBS, supra
note 1, at 27-84; Gottschalk, supra note 1, at 409-427.
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[E.G., ABC AIR CARRIER, OR BUSINESS





THIS DOCUMENT IS PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
Do NOT DISCLOSE OR COPY THIS MATERIAL
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Introduction by (Appropriate Senior
Management Official)
The information contained in this Crisis Management Plan ("CMP") is designed to assist
Crisis Management Team ("CMT" or "Team") members in the event of a Crisis. Incorporated in
these materials are checklists, to guide Team members in taking the appropriate Pre- and Post-
Crisis steps; information tables, which will provide each Team member with crucial contact,
stakeholder and product information; and an outline .... It is absolutely critical that the
Company gives the utmost attention to this crisis management planning process ....
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Mission Statement:
[E.G., ABC AIR CARRIER, OR BUSINESS OPERATOR OF
AIRCRAFT, OR AIRCRAFT DEVICE MANUFACTURER]
The mission of [the Company] is...
Company CMP Planning Manual Page 19
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Crisis Management Plan
** Below is an example of how your CMP Table of Contents may look **
I. Introduction by (Appropriate Senior Management Official)
II. Mission Statement
III. Definitions and Acronyms
IV. Attorney-Client Privilege Guidelines
V. Work Product Doctrine Guidelines
VI. Notification Tree
VII. Checklists
1. Master Planning Process
2. Pre-Crisis Notification & Implementation Plan
3. Post-Crisis Notification & Implementation Plan
4. Pre-Crisis Public Affairs
5. Post-Crisis Public Affairs
6. Pre-Crisis Legal Response & Internal Investigation





4. Emergency News Release Form
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CMT "WAR ROOM"
SUPPLIES LIST
* sufficient electrical outlets
* computers with modems that access Company files and online systems; laser printer
* portable computers with modems
* fax machine, blast fax, fax cover sheets
# preprogrammed telephones with a separate line for each member of the crisis team,
voice mail, and call interrupt
* cellular phone with listed numbers and voice mail and call interrupt connections
* telephone directories for all organizational sites
* organization chart
* diagram of a "phone tree" for calling
* media directories, governmental directories, business and professional directories
* televisions with cable to receive CNN, C-SPAN, and multiple networks
* radios, including short wave
# photocopier
* VCR and audio tape playback and copying ability
# risk area maps in hard copy or software
* body bags in the event of crisis-related deaths
* legal pads, pens, pencils, paper clips, staplers/staples
# corporation stationary, envelopes (some pre-labeled with employee or other names)
* extra stick-on labels for mailing to stakeholders
* Federal Express or other rapid delivery materials
* tables and chairs
* trash receptacles
* clocks
* restrooms/shower facilities nearby
* refreshments
Company CMP Planning Manual Page 21
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